American officials have become used to thinking about European problems in terms of insufficient military spending and economic stagnation. There is truth to this, but Europe’s real problems are even deeper.
Continental Europe has been losing share of global GDP—down from 25 percent in 1990 to 14 percent today—partly owing to national and transnational regulations that undermine creativity and industriousness.
But this economic decline is eclipsed by the real and more stark prospect of civilizational erasure. The larger issues facing Europe include activities of the European Union and other transnational bodies that undermine political liberty and sovereignty, migration policies that are transforming the continent and creating strife, censorship of free speech and suppression of political opposition, cratering birthrates, and loss of national identities and self-confidence.
Should present trends continue, the continent will be unrecognizable in 20 years or less. As such, it is far from obvious whether certain European countries will have economies and militaries strong enough to remain reliable allies. Many of these nations are currently doubling down on their present path. We want Europe to remain European, to regain its civilizational self-confidence, and to abandon its failed focus on regulatory suffocation.
This lack of self-confidence is most evident in Europe’s relationship with Russia. European allies enjoy a significant hard power advantage over Russia by almost every measure, save nuclear weapons. As a result of Russia’s war in Ukraine, European relations with Russia are now deeply attenuated, and many Europeans regard Russia as an existential threat. Managing European relations with Russia will require significant U.S. diplomatic engagement, both to reestablish conditions of strategic stability across the Eurasian landmass, and to mitigate the risk of conflict between Russia and European states.
It is a core interest of the United States to negotiate an expeditious cessation of hostilities in Ukraine, in order to stabilize European economies, prevent unintended escalation or expansion of the war, and reestablish strategic stability with Russia, as well as to enable the post-hostilities reconstruction of Ukraine to enable its survival as a viable state.
The Ukraine War has had the perverse effect of increasing Europe’s, especially Germany’s, external dependencies. Today, German chemical companies are building some of the world’s largest processing plants in China, using Russian gas that they cannot obtain at home. The Trump Administration finds itself at odds with European officials who hold unrealistic expectations for the war perched in unstable minority governments, many of which trample on basic principles of democracy to suppress opposition. A large European majority wants peace, yet that desire is not translated into policy, in large measure because of those governments’ subversion of democratic processes. This is strategically important to the United States precisely because European states cannot reform themselves if they are trapped in political crisis.
Yet Europe remains strategically and culturally vital to the United States. Transatlantic trade remains one of the pillars of the global economy and of American prosperity. European sectors from manufacturing to technology to energy remain among the world’s most robust. Europe is home to cutting-edge scientific research and world-leading cultural institutions. Not only can we not afford to write Europe off—doing so would be self-defeating for what this strategy aims to achieve.
American diplomacy should continue to stand up for genuine democracy, freedom of expression, and unapologetic celebrations of European nations’ individual character and history. America encourages its political allies in Europe to promote this revival of spirit, and the growing influence of patriotic European parties indeed gives cause for great optimism.
Our goal should be to help Europe correct its current trajectory. We will need a strong Europe to help us successfully compete, and to work in concert with us to prevent any adversary from dominating Europe.
America is, understandably, sentimentally attached to the European continent—and, of course, to Britain and Ireland. The character of these countries is also strategically important because we count upon creative, capable, confident, democratic allies to establish conditions of stability and security. , in the same way as those who signed the NATO charter.
Over the long term, it is more than plausible that within a few decades at the latest, certain NATO members will become majority non-European. As such, it is an open question whether they will view their place in the world, or their alliance with the United States, in the same way as those who signed the NATO charter.
Our broad policy for Europe should prioritize:
• Reestablishing conditions of stability within Europe and strategic stability with Russia;
• Enabling Europe to stand on its own feet and operate as a group of aligned sovereign nations, including by taking primary responsibility for its own defense, without being dominated by any adversarial power;
• Cultivating resistance to Europe’s current trajectory within European nations;
• Opening European markets to U.S. goods and services and ensuring fair treatment of U.S. workers and businesses;
• Building up the healthy nations of Central, Eastern, and Southern Europe through commercial ties, weapons sales, political collaboration, and cultural and educational exchanges;
• Ending the perception, and preventing the reality, of NATO as a perpetually expanding alliance; and
• Encouraging Europe to take action to combat mercantilist overcapacity, technological theft, cyber espionage, and other hostile economic practices.
(Delivered at the Charlemagne Prize Forum in Aachen on Wednesday 28 May 2025)
Dear all,
Dear organizers,
You are asking the toughest question we face these days: Europe without the US – is it possible?
Of course, I will speak mainly about security and defence:
what will happen to European security and defence if and when the Americans will diminish their military presence on the European continent?
My answer to your question can be very short and simple:
– First, looking into next decade, yes, it is not only possible, but almost unavoidable that we shall need to stand on our own two feet in defence matters in Europe, because Americans will more and more withdraw from Europe.
– Second, it is not only possible, but it is our duty as Europeans to be ready to assume the sole responsibility for the defence of Europe.
It will not be easy to defend Europe only by Europeans, but that is what we must be ready to do.
We will need to take care not only about the material side of defence: how many weapons we need to produce and procure. But also about the institutional and political side of the issue: how to organize European defence on our own.
This kind of a readiness will take time, but to make it possible we need to change our mindset already now: less complaining that we are being betrayed, and more rational preparation for a transatlantic division of responsibilities.
On what are we facing?
To understand the challenges we will need to overcome in our preparedness, let’s start with a short description of what we are facing now:
War in Ukraine – without clear perspectives of peace. Putin does not want peace. He thinks he is benefiting from this war. If things with peace negotiations will continue in the same way as they were going till now, war can continue until Putin decides that he has benefited enough from this war. And then he will turn to another target.
Putin‘s aggressiveness in the future will only increase. If peace would be concluded in Ukraine, Putin will continue to mobilise Russia’s war economy to produce huge amounts of weapons. At the moment Putin is able to produce 4 times more ammunition than all NATO members (including USA) produce together. Our intelligence services predict: that starting from 2027-2028, Putin can be ready to test NATO’s Article 5. This year Putin again organizes big military exercises “Zapad” in Belarus, close to the borders of Poland and Lithuania. This is done the first time since the beginning of the war in 2022.
American forthcoming withdrawal from Europe is a new reality.This does not mean American withdrawal from NATO. But China’s rising military power will push the US to shift its attention more and more to the Indo-Pacific, at the same time diminishing US presence on the European continent. That is going to happen, not because Americans do not love Europeans anymore, but because global geopolitical reality and security challenges are changing very rapidly and radically. And we need to be ready to adapt.
In short, we are now facing the “perfect storm” on the European continent:
War in Ukraine continuing;
Russian aggressiveness increasing;
American withdrawal speeding up;
and together creating conditions for a deep crisis on the European continent.
But as is often said – never waste a good crisis to take bold decisions and reforms. As Jean Monnet said in 1957: “The European Community will be created during the crises, and the sum what will be created during those crises that will be the European Community”
So during this crisis, what kind of European community in defence do we need to create?
To better understand what we need to be ready for, let’s make a short overview of the conclusions we can draw from the experience of the war in Ukraine.
On the lessons of the war in Ukraine.
We need to understand that on the European continent there are two battle tested armies, with the ability to use millions of drones: Russia and Ukraine. Ukraine – for its own defence and the defence of Europe. Russia – in preparation for its next aggression.
The biggest change in warfare is clear: today 80% of targets in Ukraine are destroyed by drones, there’s a 15 km “death valley” on both sides of front line where nothing can move. The “valley” is created by drones. Ukrainian drones and Russian drones. A traditional tank on average survives 6 minutes in this “death valley”. Every 2 months there is a need for radical innovation of the drones in operation – as the Russians learn to jam or intercept the previous models. Ukraine during this year will produce and will use 4 million drones. Russia – a similar amount.
Last week I spoke with the famous Ukrainian general, former Commander of the Ukrainian military forces in 2022-2024, Valerii Zaluzhnyi. He is now Ukrainian ambassador to the United Kingdom. And he told me, that Russia and China are learning from the war in Ukraine how a modern war of attrition develops.
At the beginning of the Russian aggression, the Russian army was at its weakest point. Now the Russian army has changed a great deal. Ukrainians say that the Russians are as good as Ukrainians at drones and electronic warfare. Sometimes even better.
We can assume that Putin started the war and continues the war not only to grab new territories, but also to learn how to fight a modern war. In the case of Russian aggression against a NATO or EU member state, we will face a battle tested Russian army, with millions of drones in its “Army of drones”.
Are we ready for that? I doubt it.
General Zaluzhnyi also told me, – the West (including the EU) is still preparing to fight the wars of yesterday.
Maybe the UK can be a source of inspiration for us. Especially now, when we signed historically important Partnership in Security and Defence. Last week, the British Army announced its new military strategy, the so called “20-40-40” strategy: – heavy equipment like tanks, infantry vehicles, helicopters will make-up 20% of fighting capability;
– single use kamikaze drones and long range missiles will make-up the first “40” %;
– reusable drones, more durable reconnaissance or attack drones will make up the remaining “40” %
This sounds very similar to the Ukrainian strategy to hit 80% of targets with drones.
The UK inspires us to update not only our military technologies, but also our military doctrines. It’s time we learn from both the Ukrainians and the British.
On what to do?
It’s time to answer the very simple question: What do we need to do to be ready to face aggression from Russia’s battle tested army, and at the same time: to prepare for the prospect of American withdrawal?
OnMaterial preparedness.
First of all, as is stated in the “White Paper”: We must urgently ensure material preparedness for defence – according to NATO defence plans and NATO capability targets. At the upcoming summit, NATO will likely ask alliance members to raise their military capability targets by 30%. But Allies are already 30% behind in delivering on existing capability targets. So the proposed increase means “there’s a huge hole ” in our readiness. That’s how NATO Supreme Allied Commander Transformation Admiral Pierre Vandier put it, at his press briefing in March.
Material preparedness means a radical increase in development and procurement of new weapons. And it means a ramp up of industrial production on the European continent. For that we need enough financial resources.
Rapid implementation of “Rearm Europe” with “SAFE” loans and activating the national escape clause – brings new hundreds of billions of financial resources into our defence industry. We need to use these instruments in the most effective way possible.
OnReplacement of US resources
Instead of complaining that the Americans are going to betray us, we need to immediately start preparations for replacing American defence resources on the European continent. Let’s have our material and political readiness programs in order to avoid an emotional, angry divorce.We must have a rational agreement with our transatlantic partners on division of responsibilities, and discuss with the partners how long it will take us and which steps we need to take to implement it.
It’s clear that 450 million Europeans should not complain that 340 million Americans are not ready to permanently defend us against 140 million Russians, who are not able during 3 years of the war to defeat 38 millions Ukrainians.
It’s also clear that in Europe we still very heavily depend on US resources, especially on so called “Strategic Enablers”: like space intelligence data, command and control centers, heavy air-lift capabilities, refueling in the air capabilities.
That is what we need to develop in Europe without delay.
Definitely, it will cost a lot of money. A leading think-tank in studies of war, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, estimates that it could cost for European allies up to 1 trillion US dollars to replace the current US contribution to NATO’s collective defence.
And the Bruegel think tank in their recent paper gives their estimate: “Europe could need 300,000 more troops and an annual defence spending hike of at least €250 billion in the short term to deter Russian aggression”.
Readiness cost a lot, but non-readiness cost much more.
OnResponsibility for peace on the European continent
In Europe we need to understand that peace is not interesting for Putin and diplomacy alone will not bring any kind of peace. A forthcoming American withdrawal from Europe, perhaps, would also mean withdrawing from the Ukraine “issue”, including on peace. So in Europe we need to change our approach on peace in Ukraine.
Until now we were mainly “waiting for peace” to happen. We first had a European hope that Ukraine itself would manage to win and to achieve peace (2022-2023 period). Then we were waiting for Biden and later for Trump to miraculously convince Putin to agree on peace. Recently we started waiting for phone calls to Putin or for negotiations in Vatican.
It does not work.
Now our last hope in our “waiting game” is that something will happen in the Kremlin or with Putin and that will bring peace. Peace will not happen while we just wait. We need to take our own responsibility and need to have our own strategy for “creation of peace” in Ukraine.
Creating conditions for peace by our own efforts means no longer waiting for anybody else to bring much needed peace. A just peace in Ukraine can be created only by making Ukraine stronger. And the only ones who can make Ukraine stronger are we, Europeans.
Onpeace through strength and support to Ukraine
According to upcoming NATO agreements, we will need to spend 3.5% of GDP for our own defence each year. But now annually we are spending less than 0.1% of our GDP to assist Ukraine in its defence. Something is wrong here with those numbers and with our military logic.
Why such a difference? Why do we think that today it is more important to take care only about our own defence capabilities, but not about sufficient capabilities for Ukraine, when Ukraine is defending us against the same threat?
I don’t understand this military logic.
We have new possibilities to change those numbers. Those possibilities are called “SAFE” loans. The Council just approved the Regulation on those loans. 150 billion euros of attractive, triple A loans, backed by the EU budget. 45 years maturity, 10 years grace period. What’s important: Member States can take those loans and spend them together with Ukraine for joint procurement from Ukraine and for Ukraine.
SAFE loans can become a breakthrough in our support to Ukraine.
OnNew European Security Architecture.
In the case of Russian aggression, we would face a powerful, battle tested army, capable of using millions of deadly drones against us. But there are no military armies in NATO with the same battle tested experience. On top of that, we face American withdrawal from Europe.
And, as the White Paper on the Future of European Defence says: “…a new international order will be formed in the second half of this decade and beyond”.
That is why we need to see a broader challenge for us: we need not only to take care about our material readiness for defence, but we need to take careabout institutional and political side of our European defence.
Looking at the long term future, it will not be enough just to spend more on defence and to produce more weapons.
In order to defend ourselves it is essential, that we “develop a European security architecture”, as stated in my Mission Letter, I received from President Von der Leyen, at the start of my mandate. Our strategic goal is to unite all efforts to strengthen European defence into “a true European Defence Union”.
If we agree, that “Defending Europe is a European task” – those are the words of my Mission Letter – then we need to agree: the European Defence Union architecture is the only way to prepare ourselves for American withdrawal.
OnUkraine and United Kingdom – integral part of European security architecture
A new European security architecture, a true European Defence Union cannot be created without Ukraine as an integral part from the very beginning. While Americans are starting to move out from Europe and Russians are growing stronger, our security in Europe depends on how rapidly we will build a new European security architecture. And Ukraine with its battle tested army and extremely innovative defence industry will be the most important part of that security architecture.
With the prospect of Americans leaving, it is obvious that we need Ukraine’s integration into the European Union as much as Ukraine needs this integration. Because this is how we can speed up building our European security architecture.
This way we can integrate Ukraine’s battle tested army without delay into our European military structures. And at the same time learn from the Ukrainians:
How to defend ourselves against the battle tested Russian army;
How to build an innovative European defence industry;
And how “to do defence” in the most innovative way.
The same is true for our relationship with the United Kingdom. Withdrawal of the United States should push Europeans towards more unity. And of course, the British have remarkable skills on the battlefield and in defence innovation. Which would bring a lot of additional strength to the European Defence Union.
OnEuropean Common Defence
We need to remember what the Article 42 part 2 of the Treaty on European Union says about European defence:
“The common security and defence policy shall include the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy. This will lead to a common defence, when the European Council, acting unanimously, so decides.”
The treaty speaks not only about the possibility to create a common Union defence policy. It defines an obligation for EU Member States to work towards common defence in the European Union. It’s obvious that the best moment to start building our common defence is exactly now, when we are facing a double crisis in defence: Russian aggressiveness is increasing, at the same time Americans are starting their withdrawal.
The peace dividend is over. The time when we could live without a common European defence – is over.
Let’s face reality, and our Treaty obligation. And let’s remember the historic roots of the Union – it was created for peace on European continent. And in parallel to the integration of coal and steel industries, there was a profound attempt to create an European Defence Community by the same godfathers of our Union of today: by Schuman, Adenauer, Monnet, de Gasperi.
The European Defence Community failed to be established at that time. Now is time to correct this historical mistake. A European Defence Union instead of the European Defence Community is the right way to go forward.
OnHow to remove the permanent threat of aggressive authoritarian post imperial Russia?
The American withdrawal from Europe would leave us not only with a material shortage of defence capabilities, but also with a gap in strategic vision: what to do with Russia?
Until now we allocated that task also to the Americans: they were declaring that Russia was part of the “new axis of evil” or that there is a need for a “reset” with Russia. Europeans usually followed the lead.
The outcome of such an approach is a more and more aggressive Putin and Russia, and new promises by President Trump to establish good relations with Putin if he will agree on peace.
These promises by President Trump are not changing Putin’s behavior and we, Europeans, are left with a question: after the Americans withdraw from Europe, what kind of strategy do we need towards Russia?
Let’s not forget: “Defence” – is not only about strengthening your own defence capabilities. It’s also about reducing your adversary’s capabilities to attack you.
How we are building up our defensive capabilities – I have just explained. How to reduce Russia’s offensive capabilities – we are not so effective. We are introducing new economic sanctions, and they are very much needed.
But it is clear – that is not enough.
The strategic question for Europeans is: how to get rid of the permanent threat of an aggressive, authoritarian post imperial Russia?
That will happen only if the Russian people by themselves will succeed in transforming Russia back to normality. Normality means first of all – no aggression anymore. There is no hope that it can happen while Putin stays in power. Without Americans, it is our responsibility as Europeans to have a specific European “Russia strategy”: to assist the Russian people in turning Russia back to normality, since any political transformation in Russia is in the hands of the Russian people.
And the best way to achieve this is by implementing our “Ukraine Strategy”: to create conditions for peace, security, integration and success for Ukraine. Because the example of Ukraine’s success can be a very powerful inspiration for the Russian people to turn Russia back to normality. That is what Putin is extremely afraid of. Because Ukraine’s success with its power of inspiration can destroy Putin’s regime.
And that’s why our strategy for Ukraine’s success is so strategically important: for the future of a much broader Eastern part of Europe, including Russia and Belarus.
OnLeadership
Crisis needs and brings leadership. History teaches us: in order to overcome crisis – there is a need of effective leadership. History also teaches us – when crisis comes, history and nations bring forward the right leaders, to overcome the crisis. That’s what happened after the Second World War, when Europe needed to unite to be able to stand against Soviet Union: Adenauer, Schuman, Churchill, Monnet, de Gasperi were the leaders, ready to face the challenges of that time. And they got the job done: our Community was born.
And today we are witnessing the same thing happening: the double challenge of Russian aggression and American withdrawal brings a new set of European leaders who are writing a new history of Europe. For example Friedrich Merz, Emmanuel Macron, Keir Starmer, Giorgia Meloni, Donald Tusk, and of course, honored here in Aachen tomorrow with the Charlemagne prize: Commission President Ursula von der Leyen.
In Conclusion
We need to remember, that history of Europe, the future of Europe, future of our kids and grandkids today is decided in Ukraine. So, to return to your question: “Europe without US – is it possible?” I will translate it into more practical and strategical one: “Is peace in Ukraine and is victory for Ukraine possible after American withdrawal?” Because this is the only single way towards sustainable peace on European continent.
My answer is – yes! It is possible – but it is our job, our job as Europeans.
Fundamentals of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence
APPROVED
by the Executive Order
of the President of the Russian Federation No.991 of November 19, 2024
FUNDAMENTALS of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence
I. General Provisions
1. These Fundamentals are a strategic planning document in the area of ensuring defence that reflects official views on the essence of nuclear deterrence, identifies military risks and threats intended to be neutralized by the implementation of nuclear deterrence, as well as defines the principles of nuclear deterrence and the conditions for the transition of the Russian Federation to the employment of nuclear weapons.
2. Assured deterrence of a potential adversary from aggression against the Russian Federation and (or) its allies is one of the highest state priorities. Deterrence of aggression is ensured by the totality of the military might of the Russian Federation, including nuclear weapons.
3. The state policy of the Russian Federation on nuclear deterrence (hereafter referred to as “state policy on nuclear deterrence”) is a set of coordinated political, military, military-technical, diplomatic, economic, information, and other measures, unified by a common concept and implemented with reliance on nuclear deterrence forces and means to prevent aggression against the Russian Federation and (or) its allies.
4. The state policy on nuclear deterrence is defensive in nature, aimed at maintaining the capabilities of nuclear forces at a level sufficient to ensure nuclear deterrence, and guarantees the protection of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state, deterrence of a potential adversary from aggression against the Russian Federation and (or) its allies, and – in the event of an outbreak of a military conflict – the prevention of the escalation in hostilities and their cessation on terms acceptable to the Russian Federation and (or) its allies.
5. The Russian Federation considers nuclear weapons as a means of deterrence, the employment of which is an extreme and compelled measure, and makes all the necessary efforts to reduce the nuclear threat and prevent aggravation of interstate relations that could trigger military conflicts, including nuclear ones.
6. The statutory legal basis of these Fundamentals consists of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, generally recognized principles and norms of international law, international treaties of the Russian Federation, federal constitutional laws, federal laws, and other statutory legal acts and documents regulating defence and security matters.
7. The provisions of these Fundamentals are binding on all federal government authorities and other government bodies and organizations involved in ensuring nuclear deterrence.
8. These Fundamentals may be adjusted to account for external and internal factors that shape defence requirements.
II. The Essence of Nuclear Deterrence
9. The Russian Federation exercises nuclear deterrence toward a potential adversary, defined as individual states and military coalitions (blocs, alliances), that consider the Russian Federation as a potential adversary and possess nuclear and (or) other types of weapons of mass destruction or significant combat capabilities of general purpose forces. Nuclear deterrence is also exercised toward states that provide territory, air and (or) sea space under their control, as well as resources for preparing and committing aggression against the Russian Federation.
10. Aggression by any state from a military coalition (bloc, alliance) against the Russian Federation and (or) its allies is considered as the aggression by this coalition (bloc, alliance) as a whole.
11. Aggression against the Russian Federation and (or) its allies by any non-nuclear state with the participation or support of a nuclear state is considered as their joint attack.
12. Nuclear deterrence is aimed to ensure that a potential adversary realizes the inevitability of retaliation in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation and (or) its allies.
13. Nuclear deterrence is ensured by the presence in the structure of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation of combat-ready forces and means capable of inflicting assured unacceptable damage on a potential adversary under any circumstances through the employment of nuclear weapons, as well as by the readiness and resolve of the Russian Federation to employ such weapons.
14. Nuclear deterrence is implemented continuously in peacetime, during the period of immediate threat of aggression, and in wartime, up to the beginning of nuclear weapons employment.
15. The main military risks that, depending on changes in the military-political and strategic situation, can evolve into military threats to the Russian Federation (threats of aggression) and that are intended to be neutralized by the implementation of nuclear deterrence are as follows:
a) possession by a potential adversary of nuclear and (or) other types of weapons of mass destruction that can be employed against the Russian Federation and (or) its allies, as well as of delivery means for these types of weapons;
b) possession and deployment by a potential adversary of missile defence systems and assets, intermediate- and shorter-range cruise and ballistic missiles, high-precision non-nuclear and hypersonic weapons, unmanned combat vehicles of various basing modes, directed energy weapons that can be used against the Russian Federation;
c) buildup by a potential adversary on the territories contiguous to the Russian Federation and its allies and in adjacent waters of general purpose forces groupings, which include nuclear weapons delivery means, and (or) military infrastructure ensuring the employment of such means;
d) development and deployment by a potential adversary of missile defence and anti-satellite warfare assets, as well as of strike systems in space;
e) deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery means on the territories of non-nuclear states;
f) establishment of new or expansion of existing military coalitions (blocs, alliances), leading to the advancement of their military infrastructure to the borders of the Russian Federation;
g) actions by a potential adversary aimed at isolating a part of the territory of the Russian Federation, including blocking access to vital transport communications;
h) actions by a potential adversary aimed at defeating (destroying, eliminating) environmentally hazardous facilities of the Russian Federation that may lead to technogenic, ecological or social disasters;
i) planning and conduct of large-scale military exercises by a potential adversary near the borders of the Russian Federation;
j) uncontrolled proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery, technologies and equipment for their manufacture.
16. The principles of nuclear deterrence are as follows:
a) continuity of activities ensuring nuclear deterrence;
b) adaptability of nuclear deterrence to military risks and threats;
c) uncertainty for a potential adversary in terms of scale, time, and place of the possible employment of nuclear deterrence forces and means;
d) centralization of state governance over the activities of federal executive authorities and organizations involved in ensuring nuclear deterrence;
e) rationality of the structure and composition of nuclear deterrence forces and means, as well as their maintenance at a level sufficient to fulfil the assigned tasks;
f) maintaining constant readiness of a designated part of nuclear deterrence forces and means for combat employment;
g) centralization of the command over the employment of nuclear weapons, including those located outside the territory of the Russian Federation.
17. The nuclear deterrence forces of the Russian Federation include land-, sea- and air-based nuclear forces.
III. Conditions for the Transition of the Russian Federation to the Employment of Nuclear Weapons
18. The Russian Federation reserves the right to employ nuclear weapons in response to the employment of nuclear and (or) other types of weapons of mass destruction against itself and (or) its allies, as well as in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation and (or) the Republic of Belarus as participants in the Union State with the employment of conventional weapons, which creates a critical threat to their sovereignty and (or) territorial integrity.
19. The conditions that enable the possibility of nuclear weapons employment by the Russian Federation are as follows:
a) receipt of reliable data on the launch of ballistic missiles attacking the territories of the Russian Federation and (or) its allies;
b) employment of nuclear or other types of weapons of mass destruction by an adversary against the territories of the Russian Federation and (or) its allies, against facilities and (or) military formations of the Russian Federation located outside its territory;
c) actions by an adversary affecting elements of critically important state or military infrastructure of the Russian Federation, the disablement of which would disrupt response actions by nuclear forces;
d) aggression against the Russian Federation and (or) the Republic of Belarus as participants in the Union State with the employment of conventional weapons, which creates a critical threat to their sovereignty and (or) territorial integrity;
e) receipt of reliable data on the massive launch (take-off) of air and space attack means (strategic and tactical aircraft, cruise missiles, unmanned, hypersonic and other aerial vehicles) and their crossing of the state border of the Russian Federation.
20. The decision to employ nuclear weapons is made by the President of the Russian Federation.
21. The President of the Russian Federation may, if necessary, inform the military-political leadership of other states and (or) international organizations about the readiness of the Russian Federation to employ nuclear weapons or of the decision taken to employ nuclear weapons, as well as of the fact of their employment.
IV. Tasks and Functions of Federal Government Authorities, Other Government Bodies and Organizations on the Implementation of State Policy on Nuclear Deterrence
22. The state policy on nuclear deterrence is directed by the President of the Russian Federation.
23. The Government of the Russian Federation takes measures to implement economic policy aimed at maintenance and development of nuclear deterrence means, as well as shapes and implements foreign and information policy in the nuclear deterrence area.
24. The Security Council of the Russian Federation sets the main directions of military policy in the nuclear deterrence area, as well as coordinates the activities of federal executive authorities and organizations involved in the implementation of the decisions by the President of the Russian Federation related to ensuring nuclear deterrence.
25. The Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, acting through the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, directly plans and implements organizational and military activities in the nuclear deterrence area.
26. Other federal executive authorities and organizations participate in the implementation of the decisions by the President of the Russian Federation related to ensuring nuclear deterrence in accordance with their authority.
Voorzitter. Stelt u zich het volgende scenario voor. Er is een escalatie aan de oostgrens van Europa. Terwijl de Russische troepen oprukken en onze NAVO-bondgenoten alarm slaan, kijkt Europa naar het westen, maar dit keer blijft het stil in Washington. Terwijl de eerste Russische troepen de Baltische staten binnen walsen, hebben we geen idee hoeveel troepen het betreft en waar ze precies binnenkomen. We beschikken namelijk niet over onze eigen intelligence en satellieten. De F-35’s die we de lucht in sturen om deze informatie te verzamelen, kunnen daar maar kort blijven, omdat we ze niet in de lucht kunnen tanken. Na drie dagen kunnen de F-35’s überhaupt niet meer boven de Baltische staten opereren omdat Rusland hier zijn luchtafweergeschut heeft geïnstalleerd en de Europese NAVO-landen nauwelijks beschikken over middelen voor suppression of enemy air defenses. Na vijf dagen is de munitie op, zijn de grenzen in Europa anders getekend en is de internationale rechtsorde, die ons 80 jaar lang veilig heeft gehouden, naar het graf gedragen. De 13de brigade, die al halverwege Duitsland richting Litouwen was gegaan, kwam te laat, en misschien maar goed ook, want qua medisch personeel is de brigade maar voor 60% gevuld, en dat is dan nog de best gevulde brigade. De goedbedoelde, vrijblijvende initiatieven, zoals het dienjaar en de wervende campagnespotjes, hebben misschien wel voor een paar honderd extra aanmeldingen gezorgd, maar niet voor de duizenden die nodig zijn.
Voorzitter. Het scenario is fictief, nog wel. Maar de tekorten bij de genoemde capaciteiten zijn dat helaas niet. Het waren precies deze capaciteiten die het de Europese landen opbrak toen ze in 2011 militair ingrepen in Libië. Toen hielpen de VS ons nog uit de brand. Nog veel erger, exact deze gebreken werden in 1999, 25 jaar geleden, al geconstateerd in Kosovo. Hoe pijnlijk. We hebben helemaal niks geleerd. Het is volkomen terecht dat de VS het ons als Europa aanrekenen dat we onze eigen verantwoordelijkheid onvoldoende hebben genomen.
Voorzitter. Het is nu meer dan 1.000 dagen na de grootschalige Russische invasie in Oekraïne. Er gaat geen dag voorbij of we worden met onze neus op de pijnlijke feiten gedrukt over hoe kwetsbaar en afhankelijk we zijn. Is de minister het met mij eens dat we de disbalans tussen de VS en de Europese NAVO-landen moeten herstellen? Zo ja, wil hij een inventarisatie maken van wat hiervoor nodig is? Is daardoor het toewerken naar 3%, de NAVO-norm, onvermijdelijk? Graag een reactie.
Voorzitter. In dit scenario heb ik het nog niet eens over het feit dat onze medische keten nu is gebouwd rond kwaliteit en niet rond kwantiteit. Deze keten is gebouwd rond de beste verpleging, terwijl het in het zwarte scenario vooral moet gaan om het redden van levens. In het scenario heb ik het alleen maar over het gemis van strategische capaciteiten, maar wist u dat op dit moment infuusvloeistoffen niet worden aangevuld omdat de fabriek in de VS door een storm platligt en we zelf niks kunnen produceren? Zijn de bewindspersonen zich bewust van deze kwetsbaarheden?
Voorzitter. Ik heb het nu ook nog niet eens over het feit dat zeven op de tien gevechtsklare militairen in Europa op dit moment Amerikanen zijn. Ik heb deze bewindspersonen veel complimenten gegeven over de Defensienota, maar op het gebied van personeel zegt deze nota nauwelijks iets nieuws en is die weinig ambitieus. Ik was daarom verheugd om het stuk via RTL te lezen. Natuurlijk is het waardeloos dat het gelekt wordt, maar het is in ieder geval positief dat er binnen Defensie wel wordt nagedacht over verplichtende vormen van het dienjaar. Het was alleen weer typerend dat de hele communicatieafdeling van Defensie, inclusief de CDS, er als de kippen bij was om dit te downplayen. Waarom? We hebben de luxe niet meer om taboes te hebben. Is de minister dat met mij eens? En wat is de status van dit stuk?
Voorzitter. Ik wil graag de bewindspersonen en al mijn collega’s een verstandig stuk van ons wetenschappelijk instituut over verplichtende vormen van dienen overhandigen. Als u dat kunt verspreiden: graag. We moeten ons niet alleen voorbereiden op het meest gevaarlijke scenario, maar ook op het meest waarschijnlijke scenario, schreef hoogleraar Martijn Kitzen vorige week in Carré. Hoewel hij de focus op hoofdtaak 1 logisch vindt, waarschuwt hij er wel voor dat onze tegenpolen zeer waarschijnlijk directe confrontaties zullen vermijden en dat zij ons proberen te destabiliseren via andere machtsmiddelen. Dit zien we bijvoorbeeld vandaag de dag al gebeuren op het Afrikaanse continent. Terwijl dit kabinet historisch bezuinigt op ontwikkelingshulp en op diplomatie, zien we dat China en Rusland in ons vacuüm springen. Het belangrijkste instrument dat ons binnen Defensie hierbij van nut kan zijn, de SOF-eenheden, missen we compleet in de Defensienota. Hoe verklaren deze bewindspersonen dat?
(passage uit een Kamerdebat over de begroting van Defensie dd 3 december 2024).
In 1990 the two Germanies and the four occupying powers (France, Soviet Union, United Kingdom and United States) negotiated about a treaty covering German unification. This is usually referred to as the ‘2+4 talks’. NATO is not mentioned in the text, instead there are references to a ‘military alliance’. Article 4 deals with post-unification military preconditions. No non-German NATO troops nor nuclear weapons could be stationed on the territory of the former German Democratic Republic. There is no talk about “NATO moving eastward” as some Russian propaganda outlets have claimed.
Treaty text:
The Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic, the French Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America,
Conscious of the fact that their peoples have been living together in peace since 1945;
Mindful of the recent historic changes in Europe which make it possible to overcome the division of the continent;
Having regard to the rights and responsibilities of the Four Powers relating to Berlin and to Germany as a whole, and the corresponding wartime and post-war agreements and decisions of the Four Powers;
Resolved, in accordance with their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;
Recalling the principles of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, signed in Helsinki;
Recognizing that those principles have laid firm foundations for the establishment of a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe;
Determined to take account of everyone’s security interests;
Convinced of the need finally to overcome antagonism and to develop cooperation in Europe;
Confirming their readiness to reinforce security, in particular by adopting effective arms control, disarmament and confidence-building measures; their willingness not to regard each other as adversaries but to work for a relationship of trust and cooperation; and accordingly their readiness to consider positively setting up appropriate institutional arrangements within the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe;
Welcoming the fact that the German people, freely exercising their right of self-determination, have expressed their will to bring about the unity of Germany as a state so that they will be able to serve the peace of the world as an equal and sovereign partner in a united Europe;
Convinced that the unification of Germany as a state with definitive borders is a significant contribution to peace and stability in Europe;
Intending to conclude the final settlement with respect to Germany;
Recognizing that thereby, and with the unification of Germany as a democratic and peaceful state, the rights and responsibilities of the Four Powers relating to Berlin and to Germany as a whole lose their function;
Represented by their Ministers for Foreign Affairs who, in accordance with the Ottawa Declaration of 13 February 1990, met in Bonn on 5 May 1990, in Berlin on 22 June 1990, in Paris on 17 July 1990 with the participation of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, and in Moscow on 12 September 1990;
Have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE 1
(1) The united Germany shall comprise the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic and the whole of Berlin. Its external borders shall be the borders of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic and shall be definitive from the date on which the present Treaty comes into force. The confirmation of the definitive nature of the borders of the united Germany is an essential element of the peaceful order in Europe.
(2) The united Germany and the Republic of Poland shall confirm the existing border between them in a treaty that is binding under international law.
(3) The united Germany has no territorial claims whatsoever against other states and shall not assert any in the future.
(4) The Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic shall ensure that the constitution of the united Germany does not contain any provision incompatible with these principles. This applies accordingly to the provisions laid down in the preamble, the second sentence of Article 23, and Article 146 of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany.
(5) The Governments of the French Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kindgom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America take formal note of the corresponding commitments and declarations by the Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic and declare that their implementation will confirm the definitive nature of the united Germany’s borders.
ARTICLE 2
The Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic reaffirm their declarations that only peace will emanate from German soil. According to the constitution of the united Germany, acts tending to and undertaken with the intent to disturb the peaceful relations between nations, especially to prepare for aggressive war, are unconstitutional and a punishable offence. The Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic declare that the united Germany will never employ any of its weapons except in accordance with its constitution and the Charter of the United Nations.
ARTICLE 3
(1) The Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic reaffirm their renunciation of the manufacture and possession of and control over nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. They declare that the united Germany, too, will abide by these commitments. In particular, rights and obligations arising from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1 July 1968 will continue to apply to the united Germany.
(2) The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, acting in full agreement with the Government of the German Democratic Republic, made the following statement on 30 August 1990 in Vienna at the Negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe:
The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany undertakes to reduce the personnel strength of the armed forces of the united Germany to 370,000 (ground, air and naval forces) within three to four years. This reduction will commence on the entry into force of the first CFE agreement. Within the scope of this overall ceiling no more than 345,000 will belong to the ground and air forces which, pursuant to the agreed mandate, alone are the subject to the Negotations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. The Federal Government regards its commitment to reduce ground and air forces as a signficant German contribution to the reduction of conventional armed forces in Europe. It assumes that in follow-on negotiations the other participants in the negotiations, too, will render their contribution to enhancing security and stability in Europe, including measures to limit personnel strengths.
The Government of the German Democratic Republic has expressly associated itself with this statement.
(3) The Governments of the French Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America take note of these statements by the Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic.
ARTICLE 4
(1) The Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics state that the united Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will settle by treaty the conditions for and the duration of the presence of Soviet armed forces on the territory of the present German Democratic Republic and of Berlin, as well as the conduct of the withdrawal of these armed forces which will be completed by the end of 1994, in connection with the implementation of the undertaking of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 3 of the present Treaty.
(2) The Governments of the French Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America take note of this statement.
ARTICLE 5
(1) Until the completion of the withdrawal of the Soviet armed forces for the territory of the present German Democratic Republic and of Berlin in accordance with Article 4 of the present Treaty, only German territorial defence units which are not integrated into the alliance structures to which German armed forces in the rest of German territory are assigned will be stationed in that territory as armed forces of the united Germany. During that period and subject to the provisions of paragraph 2 of this Article, armed forces of other states will not be stationed in that territory or carry out any other military activity there.
(2) For the duration of the presence of Soviet armed forces in the territory of the present German Democratic Republic and of Berlin, armed forces of the French Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America will, upon German request, remain stationed in Berlin by agreement to this effect between the Government of the united Germany and the Govenments of the states concerned. The number of troops and the amount of equipment of all non-German armed forces stationed in Berlin will not be greater than at the time of signature of the present Treaty. New categories of weapons will not be introduced there by non-German armed forces. The Government of the united Germany will conclude with the Governments of those states which have armed forces stationed in Berlin treaties with conditions which are fair taking account of the relations existing with the states concerned.
(3) Following the completion of the withdrawal of the Soviet armed forces from the territory of the present German Democratic Republic and of Berlin, units of German armed forces assigned to military alliance structures in the same way as those in the rest of German territory may also be stationed in that part of Germany, but without nuclear weapon carriers. This does not apply to conventional weapon systems which may have other capabilities in addition to conventional ones but which in that part of Germany are equipped for a conventional role and designated only for such. Foreign armed forces and nuclear weapons or their carriers will not be stationed in that part of Germany or deployed there.
ARTICLE 6
The right of the united Germany to belong to alliances, with all the rights and responsibilities arising therefrom, shall not be affected by the present Treaty.
ARTICLE 7
(1) The French Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America hereby terminate their rights and responsibilities relating to Berlin and to Germany as a whole. As a result, the corresponding, related quadripartite agreements, decisions and practices are terminated and all related Four Power institutions are dissolved.
(2) The United Germany shall have accordingly full sovereignty over its internal and external affairs.
ARTICLE 8
(1) The present Treaty is subject to ratification or acceptance as soon as possible. On the German side it will be ratified by the united Germany. The Treaty will therefore apply to the united Germany.
(2) The instruments of ratification or acceptance shall be deposited with the Government of the united Germany. That Government shall inform the Governments of the other Contracting Parties of the deposit of each instrument of ratification or acceptance.
ARTICLE 9
The present Treaty shall enter into force for the united Germany, the French Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America on the date of deposit of the last instrument of ratification or acceptance by these states.
ARTICLE 10
The original of the present Treaty, of which the English, French, German and Russian texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, which shall transmit certified true copies to the Governments of the other Contracting Parties.
(A ceremony for signing the treaties on the accession of the Donetsk People’s Republic, the Lugansk People’s Republic, the Zaporozhye Region and the Kherson Region to the Russian Federation took place in of the Grand Kremlin Palace’s St George Hall.)
President of Russia Vladimir Putin: Citizens of Russia, citizens of the Donetsk and Lugansk people’s republics, residents of the Zaporozhye and Kherson regions, deputies of the State Duma, senators of the Russian Federation,
As you know, referendums have been held in the Donetsk and Lugansk people’s republics and the Zaporozhye and Kherson regions. The ballots have been counted and the results have been announced. The people have made their unequivocal choice.
Today we will sign treaties on the accession of the Donetsk People’s Republic, Lugansk People’s Republic, Zaporozhye Region and Kherson Region to the Russian Federation. I have no doubt that the Federal Assembly will support the constitutional laws on the accession to Russia and the establishment of four new regions, our new constituent entities of the Russian Federation, because this is the will of millions of people. (Applause.)
It is undoubtedly their right, an inherent right sealed in Article 1 of the UN Charter, which directly states the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.
I repeat, it is an inherent right of the people. It is based on our historical affinity, and it is that right that led generations of our predecessors, those who built and defended Russia for centuries since the period of Ancient Rus, to victory.
Here in Novorossiya, [Pyotr] Rumyantsev, [Alexander] Suvorov and [Fyodor] Ushakov fought their battles, and Catherine the Great and [Grigory] Potyomkin founded new cities. Our grandfathers and great-grandfathers fought here to the bitter end during the Great Patriotic War.
We will always remember the heroes of the Russian Spring, those who refused to accept the neo-Nazi coup d’état in Ukraine in 2014, all those who died for the right to speak their native language, to preserve their culture, traditions and religion, and for the very right to live. We remember the soldiers of Donbass, the martyrs of the “Odessa Khatyn,” the victims of inhuman terrorist attacks carried out by the Kiev regime. We commemorate volunteers and militiamen, civilians, children, women, senior citizens, Russians, Ukrainians, people of various nationalities; popular leader of Donetsk Alexander Zakharchenko; military commanders Arsen Pavlov and Vladimir Zhoga, Olga Kochura and Alexei Mozgovoy; prosecutor of the Lugansk Republic Sergei Gorenko; paratrooper Nurmagomed Gadzhimagomedov and all our soldiers and officers who died a hero’s death during the special military operation. They are heroes. (Applause.) Heroes of great Russia. Please join me in a minute of silence to honour their memory.
(Minute of silence.)
Thank you.
Behind the choice of millions of residents in the Donetsk and Lugansk people’s republics, in the Zaporozhye and Kherson regions, is our common destiny and thousand-year history. People have passed this spiritual connection on to their children and grandchildren. Despite all the trials they endured, they carried the love for Russia through the years. This is something no one can destroy. That is why both older generations and young people – those who were born after the tragic collapse of the Soviet Union – have voted for our unity, for our common future.
In 1991 in Belovezhskaya Pushcha, representatives of the party elite of that time made a decision to terminate the Soviet Union, without asking ordinary citizens what they wanted, and people suddenly found themselves cut off from their homeland. This tore apart and dismembered our national community and triggered a national catastrophe. Just like the government quietly demarcated the borders of Soviet republics, acting behind the scenes after the 1917 revolution, the last leaders of the Soviet Union, contrary to the direct expression of the will of the majority of people in the referendum of 1991, destroyed our great country, and simply made the people in the former republics face this as an accomplished fact.
I can admit that they didn’t even know what they were doing and what consequences their actions would have in the end. But it doesn’t matter now. There is no Soviet Union anymore; we cannot return to the past. Actually, Russia no longer needs it today; this isn’t our ambition. But there is nothing stronger than the determination of millions of people who, by their culture, religion, traditions, and language, consider themselves part of Russia, whose ancestors lived in a single country for centuries. There is nothing stronger than their determination to return to their true historical homeland.
For eight long years, people in Donbass were subjected to genocide, shelling and blockades; in Kherson and Zaporozhye, a criminal policy was pursued to cultivate hatred for Russia, for everything Russian. Now too, during the referendums, the Kiev regime threatened schoolteachers, women who worked in election commissions with reprisals and death. Kiev threatened millions of people who came to express their will with repression. But the people of Donbass, Zaporozhye and Kherson weren’t broken, and they had their say.
I want the Kiev authorities and their true handlers in the West to hear me now, and I want everyone to remember this: the people living in Lugansk and Donetsk, in Kherson and Zaporozhye have become our citizens, forever. (Applause.)
We call on the Kiev regime to immediately cease fire and all hostilities; to end the war it unleashed back in 2014 and return to the negotiating table. We are ready for this, as we have said more than once. But the choice of the people in Donetsk, Lugansk, Zaporozhye and Kherson will not be discussed. The decision has been made, and Russia will not betray it. (Applause.) Kiev’s current authorities should respect this free expression of the people’s will; there is no other way. This is the only way to peace.
We will defend our land with all the forces and resources we have, and we will do everything we can to ensure the safety of our people. This is the great liberating mission of our nation.
We will definitely rebuild the destroyed cities and towns, the residential buildings, schools, hospitals, theatres and museums. We will restore and develop industrial enterprises, factories, infrastructure, as well as the social security, pension, healthcare and education systems.
We will certainly work to improve the level of security. Together we will make sure that citizens in the new regions can feel the support of all the people of Russia, of the entire nation, all the republics, territories and regions of our vast Motherland. (Applause.)
Friends, colleagues,
Today I would like to address our soldiers and officers who are taking part in the special military operation, the fighters of Donbass and Novorossiya, those who went to military recruitment offices after receiving a call-up paper under the executive order on partial mobilisation, and those who did this voluntarily, answering the call of their hearts. I would like to address their parents, wives and children, to tell them what our people are fighting for, what kind of enemy we are up against, and who is pushing the world into new wars and crises and deriving blood-stained benefits from this tragedy.
Our compatriots, our brothers and sisters in Ukraine who are part of our united people have seen with their own eyes what the ruling class of the so-called West have prepared for humanity as a whole. They have dropped their masks and shown what they are really made of.
When the Soviet Union collapsed, the West decided that the world and all of us would permanently accede to its dictates. In 1991, the West thought that Russia would never rise after such shocks and would fall to pieces on its own. This almost happened. We remember the horrible 1990s, hungry, cold and hopeless. But Russia remained standing, came alive, grew stronger and occupied its rightful place in the world.
Meanwhile, the West continued and continues looking for another chance to strike a blow at us, to weaken and break up Russia, which they have always dreamed about, to divide our state and set our peoples against each other, and to condemn them to poverty and extinction. They cannot rest easy knowing that there is such a great country with this huge territory in the world, with its natural wealth, resources and people who cannot and will not do someone else’s bidding.
The West is ready to cross every line to preserve the neo-colonial system which allows it to live off the world, to plunder it thanks to the domination of the dollar and technology, to collect an actual tribute from humanity, to extract its primary source of unearned prosperity, the rent paid to the hegemon. The preservation of this annuity is their main, real and absolutely self-serving motivation. This is why total de-sovereignisation is in their interest. This explains their aggression towards independent states, traditional values and authentic cultures, their attempts to undermine international and integration processes, new global currencies and technological development centres they cannot control. It is critically important for them to force all countries to surrender their sovereignty to the United States.
In certain countries, the ruling elites voluntarily agree to do this, voluntarily agree to become vassals; others are bribed or intimidated. And if this does not work, they destroy entire states, leaving behind humanitarian disasters, devastation, ruins, millions of wrecked and mangled human lives, terrorist enclaves, social disaster zones, protectorates, colonies and semi-colonies. They don’t care. All they care about is their own benefit.
I want to underscore again that their insatiability and determination to preserve their unfettered dominance are the real causes of the hybrid war that the collective West is waging against Russia. They do not want us to be free; they want us to be a colony. They do not want equal cooperation; they want to loot. They do not want to see us a free society, but a mass of soulless slaves.
They see our thought and our philosophy as a direct threat. That is why they target our philosophers for assassination. Our culture and art present a danger to them, so they are trying to ban them. Our development and prosperity are also a threat to them because competition is growing. They do not want or need Russia, but we do. (Applause.)
I would like to remind you that in the past, ambitions of world domination have repeatedly shattered against the courage and resilience of our people. Russia will always be Russia. We will continue to defend our values and our Motherland.
The West is counting on impunity, on being able to get away with anything. As a matter of fact, this was actually the case until recently. Strategic security agreements have been trashed; agreements reached at the highest political level have been declared tall tales; firm promises not to expand NATO to the east gave way to dirty deception as soon as our former leaders bought into them; missile defence, intermediate-range and shorter-range missile treaties have been unilaterally dismantled under far-fetched pretexts.
And all we hear is, the West is insisting on a rules-based order. Where did that come from anyway? Who has ever seen these rules? Who agreed or approved them? Listen, this is just a lot of nonsense, utter deceit, double standards, or even triple standards! They must think we’re stupid.
Russia is a great thousand-year-old power, a whole civilisation, and it is not going to live by such makeshift, false rules. (Applause.)
It was the so-called West that trampled on the principle of the inviolability of borders, and now it is deciding, at its own discretion, who has the right to self-determination and who does not, who is unworthy of it. It is unclear what their decisions are based on or who gave them the right to decide in the first place. They just assumed it.
That is why the choice of the people in Crimea, Sevastopol, Donetsk, Lugansk, Zaporozhye and Kherson makes them so furiously angry. The West does not have any moral right to weigh in, or even utter a word about freedom of democracy. It does not and it never did.
Western elites not only deny national sovereignty and international law. Their hegemony has pronounced features of totalitarianism, despotism and apartheid. They brazenly divide the world into their vassals – the so-called civilised countries – and all the rest, who, according to the designs of today’s Western racists, should be added to the list of barbarians and savages. False labels like “rogue country” or “authoritarian regime” are already available, and are used to stigmatise entire nations and states, which is nothing new. There is nothing new in this: deep down, the Western elites have remained the same colonisers. They discriminate and divide peoples into the top tier and the rest.
We have never agreed to and will never agree to such political nationalism and racism. What else, if not racism, is the Russophobia being spread around the world? What, if not racism, is the West’s dogmatic conviction that its civilisation and neoliberal culture is an indisputable model for the entire world to follow? “You’re either with us or against us.” It even sounds strange.
Western elites are even shifting repentance for their own historical crimes on everyone else, demanding that the citizens of their countries and other peoples confess to things they have nothing to do with at all, for example, the period of colonial conquests.
It is worth reminding the West that it began its colonial policy back in the Middle Ages, followed by the worldwide slave trade, the genocide of Indian tribes in America, the plunder of India and Africa, the wars of England and France against China, as a result of which it was forced to open its ports to the opium trade. What they did was get entire nations hooked on drugs and purposefully exterminated entire ethnic groups for the sake of grabbing land and resources, hunting people like animals. This is contrary to human nature, truth, freedom and justice.
While we – we are proud that in the 20th century our country led the anti-colonial movement, which opened up opportunities for many peoples around the world to make progress, reduce poverty and inequality, and defeat hunger and disease.
To emphasise, one of the reasons for the centuries-old Russophobia, the Western elites’ unconcealed animosity toward Russia is precisely the fact that we did not allow them to rob us during the period of colonial conquests and forced the Europeans to trade with us on mutually beneficial terms. This was achieved by creating a strong centralised state in Russia, which grew and got stronger based on the great moral valuesof Orthodox Christianity, Islam, Judaism and Buddhism, as well as Russian culture and the Russian word that were open to all.
There were numerous plans to invade Russia. Such attempts were made during the Time of Troubles in the 17th century and in the period of ordeals after the 1917 revolution. All of them failed. The West managed to grab hold of Russia’s wealth only in the late 20th century, when the state had been destroyed. They called us friends and partners, but they treated us like a colony, using various schemes to pump trillions of dollars out of the country. We remember. We have not forgotten anything.
A few days ago, people in Donetsk and Lugansk, Kherson and Zaporozhye declared their support for restoring our historical unity. Thank you! (Applause.)
Western countries have been saying for centuries that they bring freedom and democracy to other nations. Nothing could be further from the truth. Instead of bringing democracy they suppressed and exploited, and instead of giving freedom they enslaved and oppressed. The unipolar world is inherently anti-democratic and unfree; it is false and hypocritical through and through.
The United States is the only country in the world that has used nuclear weapons twice, destroying the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan. And they created a precedent.
Recall that during WWII the United States and Britain reduced Dresden, Hamburg, Cologne and many other German cities to rubble, without the least military necessity. It was done ostentatiously and, to repeat, without any military necessity. They had only one goal, as with the nuclear bombing of Japanese cities: to intimidate our country and the rest of the world.
The United States left a deep scar in the memory of the people of Korea and Vietnam with their carpet bombings and use of napalm and chemical weapons.
It actually continues to occupy Germany, Japan, the Republic of Korea and other countries, which they cynically refer to as equals and allies. Look now, what kind of alliance is that? The whole world knows that the top officials in these countries are being spied on and that their offices and homes are bugged. It is a disgrace, a disgrace for those who do this and for those who, like slaves, silently and meekly swallow this arrogant behaviour.
They call the orders and threats they make to their vassals Euro-Atlantic solidarity, and the creation of biological weapons and the use of human test subjects, including in Ukraine, noble medical research.
It is their destructive policies, wars and plunder that have unleashed today’s massive wave of migrants. Millions of people endure hardships and humiliation or die by the thousands trying to reach Europe.
They are exporting grain from Ukraine now. Where are they taking it under the guise of ensuring the food security of the poorest countries? Where is it going? They are taking it to the self-same European countries. Only five percent has been delivered to the poorest countries. More cheating and naked deception again.
In effect, the American elite is using the tragedy of these people to weaken its rivals, to destroy nation states. This goes for Europe and for the identities of France, Italy, Spain and other countries with centuries-long histories.
Washington demands more and more sanctions against Russia and the majority of European politicians obediently go along with it. They clearly understand that by pressuring the EU to completely give up Russian energy and other resources, the United States is practically pushing Europe toward deindustrialisation in a bid to get its hands on the entire European market. These European elites understand everything – they do, but they prefer to serve the interests of others. This is no longer servility but direct betrayal of their own peoples. God bless, it is up to them.
But the Anglo-Saxons believe sanctions are no longer enough and now they have turned to subversion. It seems incredible but it is a fact – by causing explosions on Nord Stream’s international gas pipelines passing along the bottom of the Baltic Sea, they have actually embarked on the destruction of Europe’s entire energy infrastructure. It is clear to everyone who stands to gain. Those who benefit are responsible, of course.
The dictates of the US are backed up by crude force, on the law of the fist. Sometimes it is beautifully wrapped sometimes there is no wrapping at all but the gist is the same – the law of the fist. Hence, the deployment and maintenance of hundreds of military bases in all corners of the world, NATO expansion, and attempts to cobble together new military alliances, such as AUKUS and the like. Much is being done to create a Washington-Seoul-Tokyo military-political chain. All states that possess or aspire to genuine strategic sovereignty and are capable of challenging Western hegemony, are automatically declared enemies.
These are the principles that underlie US and NATO military doctrines that require total domination. Western elites are presenting their neocolonialist plans with the same hypocrisy, claiming peaceful intentions, talking about some kind of deterrence. This evasive word migrates from one strategy to another but really only means one thing – undermining any and all sovereign centres of power.
We have already heard about the deterrence of Russia, China and Iran. I believe next in line are other countries of Asia, Latin America, Africa and the Middle East, as well as current US partners and allies. After all, we know that when they are displeased, they introduce sanctions against their allies as well – against this or that bank or company. This is their practice and they will expand it. They have everything in their sights, including our next-door neighbours – the CIS countries.
At the same time, the West has clearly been engaged in wishful thinking for a long time. In launching the sanctions blitzkrieg against Russia, for example, they thought that they could once again line up the whole world at their command. As it turns out, however, such a bright prospect does not excite everyone – other than complete political masochists and admirers of other unconventional forms of international relations. Most states refuse to ”snap a salute“ and instead choose the sensible path of cooperation with Russia.
The West clearly did not expect such insubordination. They simply got used to acting according to a template, to grab whatever they please, by blackmail, bribery, intimidation, and convinced themselves that these methods would work forever, as if they had fossilised in the past.
Such self-confidence is a direct product not only of the notorious concept of exceptionalism – although it never ceases to amaze – but also of the real ”information hunger“ in the West. The truth has been drowned in an ocean of myths, illusions and fakes, using extremely aggressive propaganda, lying like Goebbels. The more unbelievable the lie, the quicker people will believe it – that is how they operate, according to this principle.
But people cannot be fed with printed dollars and euros. You can’t feed them with those pieces of paper, and the virtual, inflated capitalisation of western social media companies can’t heat their homes. Everything I am saying is important. And what I just said is no less so: you can’t feed anyone with paper – you need food; and you can’t heat anyone’s home with these inflated capitalisations – you need energy.
That is why politicians in Europe have to convince their fellow citizens to eat less, take a shower less often and dress warmer at home. And those who start asking fair questions like “Why is that, in fact?” are immediately declared enemies, extremists and radicals. They point back at Russia and say: that is the source of all your troubles. More lies.
I want to make special note of the fact that there is every reason to believe that the Western elites are not going to look for constructive ways out of the global food and energy crisis that they and they alone are to blame for, as a result of their long-term policy, dating back long before our special military operation in Ukraine, in Donbass. They have no intention of solving the problems of injustice and inequality. I am afraid they would rather use other formulas they are more comfortable with.
And here it is important to recall that the West bailed itself out of its early 20th century challenges with World War I. Profits from World War II helped the United States finally overcome the Great Depression and become the largest economy in the world, and to impose on the planet the power of the dollar as a global reserve currency. And the 1980s crisis – things came to a head in the 1980s again – the West emerged from it unscathed largely by appropriating the inheritance and resources of the collapsed and defunct Soviet Union. That’s a fact.
Now, in order to free itself from the latest web of challenges, they need to dismantle Russia as well as other states that choose a sovereign path of development, at all costs, to be able to further plunder other nations’ wealth and use it to patch their own holes. If this does not happen, I cannot rule out that they will try to trigger a collapse of the entire system, and blame everything on that, or, God forbid, decide to use the old formula of economic growth through war.
Russia is aware of its responsibility to the international community and will make every effort to ensure that cooler heads prevail.
The current neocolonial model is ultimately doomed; this much is obvious. But I repeat that its real masters will cling to it to the end. They simply have nothing to offer the world except to maintain the same system of plundering and racketeering.
They do not give a damn about the natural right of billions of people, the majority of humanity, to freedom and justice, the right to determine their own future. They have already moved on to the radical denial of moral, religious, and family values.
Let’s answer some very simple questions for ourselves. Now I would like to return to what I said and want to address also all citizens of the country – not just the colleagues that are in the hall – but all citizens of Russia: do we want to have here, in our country, in Russia, “parent number one, parent number two and parent number three” (they have completely lost it!) instead of mother and father? Do we want our schools to impose on our children, from their earliest days in school, perversions that lead to degradation and extinction? Do we want to drum into their heads the ideas that certain other genders exist along with women and men and to offer them gender reassignment surgery? Is that what we want for our country and our children? This is all unacceptable to us. We have a different future of our own.
Let me repeat that the dictatorship of the Western elites targets all societies, including the citizens of Western countries themselves. This is a challenge to all. This complete renunciation of what it means to be human, the overthrow of faith and traditional values, and the suppression of freedom are coming to resemble a “religion in reverse” – pure Satanism. Exposing false messiahs, Jesus Christ said in the Sermon on the Mount: “By their fruits ye shall know them.” These poisonous fruits are already obvious to people, and not only in our country but also in all countries, including many people in the West itself.
The world has entered a period of a fundamental, revolutionary transformation. New centres of power are emerging. They represent the majority – the majority! – of the international community. They are ready not only to declare their interests but also to protect them. They see in multipolarity an opportunity to strengthen their sovereignty, which means gaining genuine freedom, historical prospects, and the right to their own independent, creative and distinctive forms of development, to a harmonious process.
As I have already said, we have many like-minded people in Europe and the United States, and we feel and see their support. An essentially emancipatory, anti-colonial movement against unipolar hegemony is taking shape in the most diverse countries and societies. Its power will only grow with time. It is this force that will determine our future geopolitical reality.
Friends,
Today, we are fighting for a just and free path, first of all for ourselves, for Russia, in order to leave dictate and despotism in the past. I am convinced that countries and peoples understand that a policy based on the exceptionalism of whoever it may be and the suppression of other cultures and peoples is inherently criminal, and that we must close this shameful chapter. The ongoing collapse of Western hegemony is irreversible. And I repeat: things will never be the same.
The battlefield to which destiny and history have called us is a battlefield for our people, for the great historical Russia. (Applause.) For the great historical Russia, for future generations, our children, grandchildren and great-grandchildren. We must protect them against enslavement and monstrous experiments that are designed to cripple their minds and souls.
Today, we are fighting so that it would never occur to anyone that Russia, our people, our language, or our culture can be erased from history. Today, we need a consolidated society, and this consolidation can only be based on sovereignty, freedom, creation, and justice. Our values are humanity, mercy and compassion.
And I want to close with the words of a true patriot Ivan Ilyin: “If I consider Russia my Motherland, that means that I love as a Russian, contemplate and think, sing and speak as a Russian; that I believe in the spiritual strength of the Russian people. Its spirit is my spirit; its destiny is my destiny; its suffering is my grief; and its prosperity is my joy.”
Behind these words stands a glorious spiritual choice, which, for more than a thousand years of Russian statehood, was followed by many generations of our ancestors. Today, we are making this choice; the citizens of the Donetsk and Lugansk people’s republics and the residents of the Zaporozhye and Kherson regions have made this choice. They made the choice to be with their people, to be with their Motherland, to share in its destiny, and to be victorious together with it.
On Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence
With a view to provide for the implementation of the State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence I hereby resolve:
1. To approve the attached Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence.
2. This Executive Order shall enter into force upon its signing.
President of the Russian Federation
Vladimir Putin
Moscow, Kremlin
June 2nd, 2020
No.355
APPROVED
by Executive Order of the President of the Russian Federation of June 2, 2020 No.355
BASIC PRINCIPLES
of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence
I. General Provisions
1. These Basic Principles represent a strategic planning document in the area of ensuring defence and reflect the official view on the essence of nuclear deterrence, identify military risks and threats to be neutralized by implementation of nuclear deterrence, the principles of nuclear deterrence, as well as the conditions for the Russian Federation to proceed to the use of nuclear weapons.
2. The guaranteed deterrence of a potential adversary from aggression against the Russian Federation and/or its allies is one of the highest state priorities. Deterrence of aggression is ensured by the entire military strength of the Russian Federation, including its nuclear weapons.
3. The State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence (hereinafter – “the State Policy on Nuclear Deterrence”) is a set of political, military, military-technical, diplomatic, economic, information and other measures, coordinated and united by a common design, implemented through reliance on forces and means of nuclear deterrence to prevent aggression against the Russian Federation and/or its allies.
4. State policy on Nuclear Deterrence is defensive by nature, it is aimed at maintaining the nuclear forces potential at the level sufficient for nuclear deterrence, and guarantees protection of national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State, and deterrence of a potential adversary from aggression against the Russian Federation and/or its allies. In the event of a military conflict, this Policy provides for the prevention of an escalation of military actions and their termination on conditions that are acceptable for the Russian Federation and/or its allies.
5. The Russian Federation considers nuclear weapons exclusively as a means of deterrence, their use being an extreme and compelled measure, and takes all necessary efforts to reduce nuclear threat and prevent aggravation of interstate relations, that could trigger military conflicts, including nuclear ones.
6. The normative and legal foundation of these Basic Principles is formed by the Constitution of the Russian Federation, universally recognized principles and norms of international law, international treaties of the Russian Federation on defence and arms control, federal constitutional laws, federal laws and other normative and legal acts and documents that regulate defence and security issues.
7. The provisions of these Basic Principles are mandatory for implementation by all federal government bodies and other government bodies and organizations that are involved in ensuring nuclear deterrence.
8. These Basic Principles may be further specified depending on the external and internal factors that influence defence implementation.
II. Essence of nuclear deterrence
9. Nuclear deterrence is aimed to provide comprehension by a potential adversary of the inevitability of retaliation in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation and/or its allies.
10. Nuclear deterrence is ensured by the presence in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation of the combat-ready forces and means that are capable to inflict guaranteed unacceptable damage on a potential adversary through employment of nuclear weapons in any circumstances, as well as by the readiness and resolve of the Russian Federation to use such weapons.
11. Nuclear deterrence is ensured continuously in peacetime, in periods of a direct threat of aggression and also in wartime, up until the actual use of nuclear weapons.
12. The main military risks that might evolve into military threats (threats of aggression) to the Russian Federation due to changes in the military-political and strategic situation, and that are to be neutralized by implementation of nuclear deterrence, are as follows:
a) build-up by a potential adversary of the general purpose forces groupings that possess nuclear weapons delivery means in the territories of the states contiguous with the Russian Federation and its allies, as well as in adjacent waters;
b) deployment by states which consider the Russian Federation as a potential adversary, of missile defence systems and means, medium- and shorter-range cruise and ballistic missiles, non-nuclear high–precision and hypersonic weapons, strike unmanned aerial vehicles, and directed energy weapons;
c) development and deployment of missile defence assets and strike systems in outer space;
d) possession by states of nuclear weapons and (or) other types of weapons of mass destruction that can be used against the Russian Federation and/or its allies, as well as means of delivery of such weapons;
e) uncontrolled proliferation of nuclear weapons, their delivery means, technology and equipment for their manufacture;
f) deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery means in the territories of non-nuclear weapon states.
13. The Russian Federation implements its nuclear deterrence with regard to individual states and military coalitions (blocs, alliances) that consider the Russian Federation as a potential adversary and that possess nuclear weapons and/or other types of weapons of mass destruction, or significant combat potential of general purpose forces.
14. While implementing nuclear deterrence, the Russian Federation takes into account the deployment by a potential adversary, in the territories of other countries, of offensive weapons (cruise and ballistic missiles, hypersonic aerial vehicles, strike unmanned aerial vehicles), directed energy weapons, missile defence assets, early warning systems, nuclear weapons and/or other weapons of mass destruction that may be used against the Russian Federation and/or its allies.
15. The principles of nuclear deterrence are as follows:
a) compliance with international arms control commitments;
b) continuity of activities ensuring nuclear deterrence;
c) adaptability of nuclear deterrence to military threats;
d) unpredictability for a potential adversary in terms of scale, time and place for possible employment of forces and means of nuclear deterrence;
e) centralization of governmental control over the activities of federal executive bodies and organizations involved in ensuring nuclear deterrence;
f) rationality of structure and composition of nuclear deterrence forces and means and their maintaining at the minimal level sufficient for implementing the tasks assigned;
g) maintaining permanent readiness of a designated fraction of nuclear deterrence forces and means for combat use.
16. The nuclear deterrence forces of the Russian Federation include land-, sea- and air-based nuclear forces.
III. Conditions for the transition of the Russian Federation to the use of nuclear weapons
17. The Russian Federation reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and/or its allies, as well as in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy.
18. The decision to use nuclear weapons is taken by the President of the Russian Federation.
19. The conditions specifying the possibility of nuclear weapons use by the Russian Federation are as follows:
a) arrival of reliable data on a launch of ballistic missiles attacking the territory of the Russian Federation and/or its allies;
b) use of nuclear weapons or other types of weapons of mass destruction by an adversary against the Russian Federation and/or its allies;
c) attack by adversary against critical governmental or military sites of the Russian Federation, disruption of which would undermine nuclear forces response actions;
d) aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy.
20. The President of the Russian Federation might, if necessary, inform the military-political leadership of other states and/or international organizations about the Russian Federation’s readiness to use nuclear weapons or about the decision taken to use nuclear weapons, as well as about the fact that nuclear weapons have been used.
IV. Tasks and functions of federal government authorities, other government bodies and organizations for implementing state policy on nuclear deterrence
21. Overall direction of state policy in the area of nuclear deterrence is carried out by the President of the Russian Federation.
22. The Government of the Russian Federation implements measures to carry out the economic policy aimed at maintaining and developing nuclear deterrence assets shapes and exercises the foreign and information policy in the area of nuclear deterrence.
23. The Security Council of the Russian Federation shapes the basic principles of military policy in the area of nuclear deterrence, coordinates the activities of federal executive bodies and organizations involved in implementation of the decisions adopted by the President of the Russian Federation and related to ensuring nuclear deterrence.
24. The Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, acting through the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, directly plans and carries out organizational and military measures in the area of nuclear deterrence.
25. Other federal executive bodies and organizations participate in the implementation of decisions adopted by the President of the Russian Federation and related to ensuring nuclear deterrence in accordance with their authority.
Petr Kozlov: Alexei Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation and headquarters were designated as extremist organisations and disbanded this year. He is in prison now, after being poisoned, conducting an investigation into the poisoning and claiming to have identified the individuals involved.
Over 100 media outlets have been put on the foreign agents’ registry. Most of them were listed this year, actually, during the past six months.
What happened in Russia recently for the number of those who the authorities consider extremists, undesirable organisations or foreign agents to have grown so fast?
Let me say a few words about history. You often talk about history, and you know it. Probably, you remember that each time power in Russia was concentrated in the hands of one person in the absence of active opposition, when Russia was in a state of active, acute confrontation with the West, ultimately this situation prompted a response which plunged the country into the abyss of wars and revolutions. Do you not think that you, possessing all the power, are now laying the foundation, perhaps, for such wars and revolutions?
Thank you.
Vladimir Putin: First of all, speaking of history, as a reminder, our opponents have been saying throughout the centuries that Russia cannot be defeated, but can only be destroyed from within, which they successfully accomplished during World War I, or rather, after it ended, and then in the 1990s, when the Soviet Union was being dismantled from within. Who was doing it? Someone serving the interests of others that run counter to the interests of the Russian and other peoples of the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, and the Russian Federation today.
Vladimir Putin
You mentioned the person who was allegedly poisoned. The Prosecutor’s Office of the Russian Federation has sent multiple official inquiries asking to provide at least some materials corroborating that he was in fact poisoned. There are none. How can this be explained? Not a single thing about Novichok or whatever you call it.
We suggested that our specialists go there and join the investigation. I spoke with the President of France and the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, asking them to allow our specialists to come, take samples and verify things, so that we can at least have some grounds to open a criminal case. No response whatsoever. We ask them: how can this be explained? Silence. So, there is no need to discuss it, let us turn the page if there is nothing to say in response.
As for inmates, every country has always had them, and that is never going to change. Do not commit criminal offences under the guise of political activity.
Next, regarding the list of media acting as foreign agents and media outlets designated as foreign agents. I agree with you, it’s not good. But let me remind you once again that this law was not invented here; it was invented in a state that – you represent the UK here, and the UK is the closest ally of the United States – a state everyone considers to be the beacon of democracy.
The United States adopted this act back in the 1930s, but this is not the point. What is important is that it is in effect now. It is in force today. About 0.034 [percent] organisations have been labelled foreign agents there. Is this surprising now? We have the same share of foreign agents, 0.034, the same number. What is the difference? The difference is that in the United States, if you have not shut down, you face criminal liability, up to five years in prison. Even if you stop any activity and close the organisation it does not exempt you from criminal liability – five years.
We do nothing like that. We do not prohibit the work of these organisations; we just want organisations that are engaged in internal political activity in Russia to clearly explain and disclose the sources of funding for their operations. That is all, they can continue doing what they are doing. Our law is much more liberal. If you think this is not enough, if, like your colleague here, you think we need to introduce liability, administrative or criminal, for failure to get vaccinated – why don’t we introduce criminal liability for foreign agents’ operations if the organisation fails to close, like in the US? But we do not even demand termination of their operations – we just want them to be honest about their sources of funding.
There may be questions about the understanding of ‘political activity.’ I agree with you here. There may be questions about regulating this kind of activity. We have 74 organisations designated as foreign agents of 200,000 registered NGOs – that’s 0.034. Just like in the States, but we do not have such severe penalties, which include criminal liability.
Now, regarding keeping power in the same hands. We have distinct branches of power – the executive, legislative and judicial authorities. Clearly, the delineation of authority between these branches can have minor variations depending on the specific country at a specific stage of its development. We will strive to ensure that they are independent, so that the country is cohesive, efficient and forward-looking. And in the end, it will be up to the Russian people to choose their system of society and state, not up to those who you serve today.
Next, please.
Dmitry Peskov: Let us continue. I suggest giving the floor to the television channels
Vladimir Putin: Of course.
Dmitry Peskov: I see NTV, Irada Zeinalova. You do not need to introduce yourself.
Irada Zeinalova: Good afternoon, Mr President, colleagues.
Since we were talking about history, I would say that things are happening almost according to [Alexander] Gorchakov, who said, “Russia is focusing.” Of course, we would like to focus on our internal problems, to address our internal affairs.
However, over the past few weeks the global media have been fuelling tension, saying that the Russians are coming, Russia is planning to attack Ukraine and wants war. Serious people call you, and you talk with them and explain our position, but they do not calm down. As a result, we send our proposals, establish our ‘red lines’ and, roughly speaking, explain the rules of the game, which, you must agree, did not exist before. For the past 30 years, we have been living in a swamp and have been told that we do not meet certain standards.
We have set our red lines, and we know that we have outlined our security priorities and interests. But we also remember from history that any agreement reached during negotiations can remain on paper, the way it happened many times in the past. The smallest provocation after such talks can lead to a big war, and the agreements remain on paper or are forgotten again.
So, here is my question. Mr President, what should we prepare for? What is a realistic outlook, and since the word “war” has been said out-loud, have we estimated the probability of war even as the result of a provocation?
Vladimir Putin: You brought up Gorchakov and the end of his phrase, “Russia is focusing.” You may also recall that the first part of the phrase – in reply to a question about whether Russa was angry – was, “No, Russia is not angry, Russia is focusing.”
I will try to give a short answer, yet I will have to begin at the beginning. The aggravation began in 2014. Before that, even though the Soviet Union had ceased to exist and part of historically Russian territories with a historically Russian population, primarily in Ukraine, had found themselves living outside Russia, we accepted that as a fact of life and felt more or less comfortable about it. We even helped those new republics to get back on their feet, and we worked, were ready to work and are still working together with their governments, whatever their foreign policy priorities.
Suffice it to recall our relations with President [Viktor] Yushchenko and Prime Minister [Yulia] Timoshenko, who indicated, like the current Ukrainian leadership, their absolutely pro-Western position. But we worked with them anyway. It is true that we argued over gas, and there were conflicts, but eventually we came to an agreement, and we worked, and were ready to continue to work together, and we never even thought about doing anything about Crimea.
But what happened in 2014? A bloody coup, people were killed and burned alive. I am not talking now about who was right and who was to blame. Obviously, Ukrainian citizens were rightfully indignant and displeased at what was happening in the country. The then president, Yanukovych, had agreed to everything. Three foreign ministers – of Poland, Germany and France – guaranteed the peaceful development of the situation and the peace process. I talked with the US president at that time at his initiative. He asked me to support this process as well. Everyone agreed but then a coup took place in a day or two. What for? There is no answer. Why was it needed? President Yanukovych agreed to everything anyway. He was ready to give up power anytime. The elections and the victory of the opposition were inevitable. Everyone knew this very well. Why was it done then?
Then Crimea happened. But how could we turn down the request of Sevastopol and Crimea, the people who lived there, to take them under our protection, under our wing? It was not possible. We were simply put in a situation where we could not have acted differently. Or were we supposed to just look on passively at what was happening in the southeast, in Donbass, which has only ever thought of itself as part of Russia, even during the formation of the USSR in 1922–1924? But Lenin and his comrades wedged Donbass in there by force. At first, they decided to make it part of Russia and then said the decision had to be revised.
They revised it and created a country that had never existed before. We will not talk about it now, but this is what happened then. They crammed in there the historical lands of people whom nobody asked how or where they wanted to live. All right, this is what happened, we agreed. But we had to do something in 2014 and this led to the crisis that is unfolding today.
All right, the Ukrainian authorities twice attempted to resolve the Donbass problem by force although we persuaded them not to do this. I personally persuaded Mr Poroshenko: Anything but military operations! Yes, yes, he said and then resorted to force. What was the result? Encirclement, losses and the Minsk agreements. Are they good or not? I think they are the only possible way out. So, what is the problem? There is no desire to implement them. They adopted a law on indigenous people and announced that the Russian people who lived on this land, on their own land, were not indigenous. Incidentally, the same was done to Poles, Hungarians and Romanians. Hence the disputes in Ukraine’s relations with these countries. They exist. They do not get a lot of attention, but they are there.
Language came next. The Russians and the Russian-speaking population are being forced from their historical lands – that is what is happening. All right. Everyone says: Russia must abide by the Minsk agreements. We agreed. But they, the government suddenly submitted to parliament a law on a transitional period. How does it tally with the Minsk agreements? Instead of amnesty, this law provides for a ban on amnesty, all but criminal liability for amnesty. Instead of elections, this law introduces military government, and instead of amnesty – lustration. What is all this about? And they got it approved by the Venice Commission. So, how are we supposed to react to all this?
This is the domestic policy component. But then we hear: war, war, war. You could get the impression that maybe a third military operation is in the making. Moreover, they are warning us in advance: “Do not interfere, do no protect these people. If you do interfere to protect these people, certain sanctions will follow.” It may well be that they are preparing for this. This is the first option we need to respond to, and act, while keeping this in mind.
The second option is, in general, to create, as I said in my article, an anti-Russia of sorts on this territory by constantly stockpiling the latest weapons there and brainwashing the local population. Just imagine how Russia must live and carry on, from a historical perspective? Do we have to live, while constantly keeping an eye on what is going on over there, and what new weapons’ systems were delivered? Under the cover of these new weapons’ systems radicals may well decide to settle the Donbass issue, as well as the Crimean issue, by military means. Why did they support the Crimean Platform? On the sidelines they keep saying: “Fine, let’s forget about Crimea.” But no! They mean to get even there.
After all, we have to be mindful of our own security, not just for today and not just for next week, but in the short term. How is Russia to live with all this? Do we always have to stay on guard, watching what happens there and when a strike might come?
This is a serious matter. I have just spoken about our plans for infrastructure development, social policy, and healthcare. But what does it all mean if we end up in the conflict you are asking about? This is not our choice, and we do not want this.
It is for this reason that I responded to President Biden’s proposal, who suggested appointing responsible representatives to lead strategic stability talks. Stability and security, ensuring security on this territory and in this area is one of the key matters on today’s agenda. We must understand how to ensure our security. With this in mind, we spoke out clearly and directly against any further eastward expansion by NATO. The ball is in their court. They need to respond in one way or another.
In this connection, I would like to emphasise that the overall response we have been seeing has been quite positive. Our American partners are telling us that they are ready to launch this conversation by starting talks early next year in Geneva. Both sides have appointed representatives. I hope that the situation develops in this very direction.
(…)
Dmitry Peskov: Maybe we should give the floor to foreign media.
Sky News.
Diana Magnay: Thank you for taking my question. I am afraid it is in English.
You have talked a lot about security guarantees, and now we have seen your proposals. You also say you have no intention of invading Ukraine.
So, will you guarantee unconditionally that you will not invade Ukraine or any other sovereign country? Or does that depend on how negotiations go?
And another question: what is it, do you think, that the West does not understand about Russia or about your intentions?
Thank you
Vladimir Putin: Regarding your question about guarantees or whether things depend on the negotiations, our actions will not depend on the negotiation process, but rather on unconditional guarantees for Russia’s security today and in the historical perspective.
In this connection, we have made it clear that any further movement of NATO to the East is unacceptable. Is there anything unclear about this? Are we deploying missiles near the US border? No, we are not. It is the United States that has come to our home with its missiles and is already standing at our doorstep. Is it going too far to demand that no strike systems be placed near our home? What is so unusual about this?
What would the Americans say if we stationed our missiles on the border between Canada and the United States, or between Mexico and the United States? Haven’t Mexico and the US had territorial disputes in the past? Which country owned California? And Texas? Have you forgotten? All right, nobody is talking about this now the way they are talking about Crimea. Very well. But we are trying to avoid talking about the creation of Ukraine as well. Who created it? Vladimir Lenin did, when he established the Soviet Union. This is set out in the 1922 Treaty on the creation of the Soviet Union and in the 1924 Constitution. True, this happened after his death, but in accordance with the principles he formulated.
But the matter at hand concerns security, not history, but security guarantees. This is why it is not the negotiations themselves but the results that matter to us.
We remember, as I have mentioned many times before and as you know very well, how you promised us in the 1990s that [NATO] would not move an inch to the East. You cheated us shamelessly: there have been five waves of NATO expansion, and now the weapons systems I mentioned have been deployed in Romania and deployment has recently begun in Poland. This is what we are talking about, can you not see?
We are not threatening anyone. Have we approached US borders? Or the borders of Britain or any other country? It is you who have come to our border, and now you say that Ukraine will become a member of NATO as well. Or, even if it does not join NATO, that military bases and strike systems will be placed on its territory under bilateral agreements. This is the point.
And you are demanding guarantees from me. It is you who must give us guarantees, and you must do it immediately, right now, instead of talking about it for decades and doing what you want, while talking quietly about the need for security guarantees to everyone. This is the point. Are we threatening anyone?
Now to your second question. Repeat it, please.
Diana Magnay: What is it that you think that the West does not understand about Russia or about your intentions?
Vladimir Putin: Does the West understand or fail to understand something? You know, sometimes I get the feeling we live in different worlds. I just talked about things that are obvious. How can you not understand them? They told us: there will be no expansion, but they expanded. They promised us equal guarantees for all under several international treaties. But this equal security has failed to materialise.
Look, back in 1918, an aide to US President Woodrow Wilson said that it would be a relief for the entire world if instead of one huge Russia, that a separate state in Siberia and another four countries in the European part be created.
In 1991, we divided ourselves into 12, I believe, parts, and we did this ourselves. Still, it seems that this was not enough for our partners. They believe that Russia is too big as it is today. This is because the European countries themselves turned into small states. Instead of vast empires, they are now small states with 60 to 80 million people. However, even after the Soviet Union collapsed, and we were left with just 146 million, it is still too much for them. I believe that this is the only way to explain this unrelenting pressure.
Take the 1990s, for example. The Soviet Union did everything to build normal relations with the West and the United States. I have said this many times, and I will repeat it, so that your listeners and viewers understand. I do not recall what media outlet you represent, but this is not the point. We had representatives from American intelligence services at our nuclear, military facilities; monitoring Russia’s nuclear weapons sites was their job. They went there every day and even lived there. Many advisors, including CIA staffers, worked in the Russian Government.
What else did you need? Why did they have to support terrorists in the North Caucasus and use organisations of a clearly terrorist nature in attempts to break the Russian Federation apart? But they did this, and as former Director of the Federal Security Service, I know this all too well. We worked with double agents, and they reported to us on the objectives set for them by Western intelligence services. But why? They should have treated Russia as a potential ally, and made it stronger, but it all went in the opposite direction; they wanted to break it down even further.
And then they started expanding NATO eastwards. Of course, we told them not to do this, arguing that they promised not to. But they asked us: “Do you have any paper record? No? If not, go away, we don’t care about your concerns.” This continued year after year, every time we showed our teeth and tried to prevent something and voice our concerns. But no: they did not want to hear anything, saying that they would do what they considered necessary.
There were one, two, three, four, five – five waves of expansion. What is it they don’t understand? I don’t know. You can say that this is all abundantly clear. I do believe that it is clear as daylight: we want to ensure our security.
(…)
Ekho Moskvy, please.
Maxim Kurnikov: Maxim Kurnikov, Ekho Moskvy.
Mr President, I would like to continue with the topic that my colleague from Sky News began. She asked for some guarantees, and you said we would not give any guarantees. But you have already spoken with Biden several times, at least twice, as far as we know, and I want to understand how you see this situation. Do you have the same vision for the future of Donbass, and the future of the Minsk agreements? Because when later we hear statements from the White House, and statements from Mr Peskov, it sounds as if many things coincide, or seems to coincide, and yet the word ‘war’ is heard increasingly often.
Here we are, discussing the possibility of war. But at this very moment, Ukrainians are probably watching us and spitting at the screen, because war already came to their land in 2014, and they actually hold you and me responsible for it. They might not be aware of the details of who issues which orders, but they actually believe Russia is already at war with Ukraine.
You refused to give guarantees. How do you see it?
I received calls from listeners the day before yesterday, and we talked about how their families were discussing a possible war with Ukraine. And actually, it is shocking enough just to say the words. How do these thoughts appear inside your head, what do you think about this, is it possible? How can one give an order to a Russian soldier to shoot at a Ukrainian one, and vice versa?
And one more short remark. There are people who could not attend this news conference, and my colleague from Novaya Gazeta, Dmitry Muratov, a Nobel prize winner, gave me a question for you. I will read it out, so as not to miss a single word: “Mr President, do you personally know the names of those who ordered the murders of Politkovskaya and Nemtsov?”
Vladimir Putin: Let us start with the last part. I made every effort to see these cases solved; all the necessary instructions, directives and orders were given to every law enforcement and special service. As you know, people have been convicted and incarcerated for the crimes they have committed. Some say they are contractors, not the employers – the latter got left out of the equation, went into hiding or were given shelter, but investigative bodies have no knowledge of this. They have made every effort to expose the perpetrators of these crimes, and some of them died while being apprehended. I think you are aware of this.
And in general, I think that this score-settling is not just unacceptable, it does nothing but harm our country. So, I am absolutely sure that, even if there were some political motives, that can also be accommodated in the minds of those who do not understand what they are doing. But they must understand that the state will fight this kind of crime. We will continue doing everything within our power. If it was really ordered by someone that we do not know about, we will look for them. This is my first point.
Now, the first part of your question, the future of Donbass. The future of Donbass must be determined by the people who live in Donbass. There is no other way. We see ourselves as mediators for creating the best conditions in which the local population can determine its own future. Are there problems? Yes, because, according to the Minsk agreements, Russia is to act as a mediator but somebody else wants to make us a party to this conflict. There is no such provision in the Minsk agreements and it is not something we agreed to.
Speaking about those who may be spitting at the screen while watching this or any other event, there will always be people to spit at the screen, whether it is showing today’s event or what is happening in Ukraine: horrible poverty and the prospect of a harsh winter. When Verkhovna Rada deputies visit regions, they meet pensioners who ask them: “Why are you killing us?” Of course, they spit at the TV when they hear the bragging of the current Kiev regime. No matter the cause, there will always be people who spit, on both sides.
How can someone issue orders to shoot? You should ask the political leaders of Ukraine how they bring themselves to issue orders to fire on Donbass every single day.
You know, some time ago we reached agreement that only senior officials, all the way up to the relevant ministries, are allowed to issue orders to retaliate if either party fires. In one case it is Donetsk and Lugansk, and in another it is Kiev.
Why that decision? To make sure that attacks cease. The Kiev officials later back-pedalled and authorised field commanders to issue this kind of order. The shooting resumed. Ask them why they did that and how they brought themselves to issue orders to shoot at their own citizens since they consider Donbass residents Ukrainian citizens? Their own citizens. Not some other country.
As for the future, the Minsk agreements state that the Ukrainian Constitution must be amended to grant these regions autonomy, to hold elections and grant amnesty. As I said, what do we see in the draft law on transition period? A military government instead of elections. Lustration instead of amnesty. Returning troops to their permanent bases instead of elections and political solutions to political issues. This is the reality. What does it mean, returning troops to their permanent bases? It means sending troops to the territory without any political process or elections.
Look, as I have already said, there is a requirement in the Minsk Agreements to amend the Constitution. Where are these amendments? It is written there that these amendments must be coordinated with the representatives of the LPR and the DPR. They must be coordinated. I remember this perfectly well because I took part in drafting these solutions. Far from coordinating anything or making any proposals on amending the Constitution, they are refusing pointblank even to talk with Donbass representatives, although when these agreements were signed in Minsk, they insisted that Donbass representatives sign this document. And they did. Frankly, they were refusing to sign it. We had to talk to them to persuade them to do it. They did but now nobody is even talking to them. They are called terrorists and any possibility of talking with them is rejected. Can you explain why? Because instead of responding to the call for peace in Ukrainian society, which Zelensky exploited to come to power, he chose not to keep his promises, having fallen, like previous leaders, under the influence of radical elements that are called “natsi’ in Ukraine.
What is the problem for us? I think I have said about Donbass. We want to build friendly relations with Ukraine, moreover, we want to achieve this at any cost and will go to practically any lengths. But how is it possible to develop relations with the current leaders, considering what they are doing? It is practically impossible.
However, we are ready to work with those who would like to develop relations with Russia in the spirit of friendship. What is happening with these forces? Extrajudicial executions, sanctions against Ukrainian nationals in violation of Ukrainian law and Constitution, or simply killings in the street. Nobody is looking for the murderers.
You just asked me about murders that sadly took place in our country. You asked, where are those who ordered the contract killing? People are in prison. Whether they ordered it or not, they are in prison in any event. And what happens there? If a murder takes place in the street, nobody searches for the culprit at all. People were burned alive in the Trade Union House in Odessa – has anyone lifted a finger to find the criminals? Not in the least.
In other words, we do not have any chance of working with those people who want to move relations forward. The people who want to work with us are being destroyed – this is the gist of the problem.
Now about my agreements with President Biden. Yes, I have already said that he suggested appointing official representatives for discussing strategic stability issues including our concerns over the growing threat from Ukraine. He made an offer, we countered, and I think it was a very constructive and quick deal. Incidentally, I told him during our conversation: I promise you that we will send you our proposals in the near future. And we did this, we sent them to both the United States and NATO. We are ready to discuss them at the OSCE platform as well. I hope this first positive reaction and the announcement that work will begin shortly, in the first days of January, will allow us to move forward.
(..)
(While answering a question about the 2022 Olympic Games:) I have already talked about the situation with NATO’s eastward expansion. Why did they have to do this? Take, for instance, Egon Bahr. He was a politician from the Social Democratic Party of Germany and proposed building a new security architecture in Europe after the Soviet troops left Germany and Eastern Europe: keeping NATO without expanding it to Central and Eastern European countries, and creating a new system of equal security with Canada, the United States and Russia. According to the archival documents on his talks with the Soviet leaders, including Falin and others, otherwise the virtual Berlin wall will keep moving east, leaving us with the same problems. This is precisely what happened. Why? This was an attempt at containment. However, this is an erroneous policy, just like the attempt to use sports for momentary political gain.
De voorzitter: Dank u wel, mevrouw Van der Plas. Dan geef ik tot slot het woord aan de heer Van Meijeren van Forum voor Democratie.
De heer Van Meijeren (FVD): Dank u wel, mevrouw de voorzitter. In een functionerende democratie zou de journalistiek moeten optreden als waakhond, als controleur van de macht, altijd op zoek naar de waarheid en niets dan de waarheid.
Mevrouw Michon-Derkzen (VVD): Ik wil aan de heer Van Meijeren vragen of het klopt dat ook zijn partij de pers tuig van de richel vindt, en ook vindt dat de mainstreammedia fakenieuws brengen.
De heer Van Meijeren (FVD): Op die laatste vraag zeg ik in ieder geval een volmondig ja. De mainstreammedia brengen aan de lopende band desinformatie en fakenieuws. Het is werkelijk schandalig. Daarmee zou ik een groot deel van de journalisten die werken voor de mainstreammedia, uitzonderingen daargelaten, ook wel willen omschrijven als tuig van de richel. Ja.
De voorzitter: Tot slot, mevrouw Michon-Derkzen, en dan mevrouw Van der Werf.
Mevrouw Michon-Derkzen (VVD): Het is prettig dat we dit gelijk aan het begin van het betoog weten. Ik stel vast dat de heer Van Meijeren van Forum voor Democratie direct bijdraagt aan de bedreigingen en het geweld waar journalisten dagelijks mee te maken hebben. Hij is onderdeel van deze Kamer. Hij bevestigt nog een keer die walgelijke zinnen die hij en zijn voorman ook op Twitter zeggen. Hij neemt daar dus duidelijk geen afstand van, waarvan akte.
De voorzitter: Mevrouw Van der Werf, D66.
De heer Van Meijeren (FVD): Nou, ik wil hier eigenlijk wel even kort op reageren hoor.
De voorzitter: Ja, dat mag. Gaat uw gang.
De heer Van Meijeren (FVD): Wij maken ons op geen enkele manier schuldig aan agressie of bedreiging richting journalisten. Wij hechten wel een waardeoordeel aan journalisten die hun taak als controleur van de macht totaal niet serieus nemen en desinformatie verspreiden. Journalisten die zelf dapper genoeg zijn om mensen aan te merken als “nazi”, “racist”, “fascist”, “complotdenker”, “wappie”, en daarmee zelf het klimaat creëren van een toelaatbaarheid van geweld tegen politieke tegenstanders … Dan is het niet zo vreemd dat daar ook met woorden een keer iets tegen ingebracht wordt. Dus ik zie dat totaal niet als het bijdragen aan agressie. Totaal niet, nee.
Mevrouw Van der Werf (D66): De heer Van Meijeren had het net over desinformatie. Wat nu eigenlijk wel steeds duidelijker wordt, is de rol die zijn partij, Forum van Democratie, zelf speelt in het verspreiden van desinformatie, en dan met name als het gaat om bijvoorbeeld coronacomplottheorieën. Een recent onderzoek van The London Story liet zien hoe uw partij die desinformatie over COVID-19 actief promoot, onder andere via politieke advertenties op Facebook. En uw partij had daar maar liefst twee ton voor over. Heeft u enig idee hoe groot de impact daarvan is, van die desinformatie?
De heer Van Meijeren (FVD): Nou, mijn vraag is eigenlijk: zou deze spreker kunnen toelichten welke informatie die wij verspreid hebben, zij aanmerkt als “desinformatie”? Want anders kan ik deze vraag niet beantwoorden. Wij verspreiden geen desinformatie.
De voorzitter: Ik geef mevrouw Van der Werf de kans om dit toe te lichten. Mevrouw Van der Werf?
Mevrouw Van der Werf (D66): Ja, voorzitter. Ik ben uiteraard bereid om dat onderzoek van The London Story naar u toe te mailen na dit debat, maar dat kan ik hier niet via de microfoon doen. Het feit alleen al dat u dat geen desinformatie noemt, het continu ondermijnen van alles wat wetenschappers en journalisten over deze pandemie schrijven, tja, dat is ook een ondermijning van onze democratie. En dat is waar ik hier de heer Van Meijeren op aanspreek. Voelt u dan geen enkele verantwoordelijkheid naar al die mensen die dat lezen, die denken “nou, ik zal dan maar geen vaccinatie gaan halen”? Voor journalisten die zich bedreigd voelen vanwege taal die u naar hen uitslaat? Dat is toch gewoon walgelijk?
De heer Van Meijeren (FVD): Nou ja. Mevrouw Van der Werf kan kennelijk niet eens zeggen welke informatie moet worden aangemerkt als “desinformatie”. Als het informatie is waar mensen de conclusie uit trekken dat ze geen vaccin moeten gaan halen, dan geef ik ze groot gelijk. Ik geef iedereen bij dezen het advies om je vooral níét te laten injecteren met een experimentele gentherapie, waarvan de bijwerkingen op lange termijn nog niet eens onderzocht zijn. En de desinformatie wordt verspreid door het RIVM, dat verspreidt dat die vaccinaties veilig zijn en voldoende zijn onderzocht. Dát is desinformatie. Het RIVM verspreidt desinformatie, en heeft een geschiedenis als grootste verspreider van desinformatie in deze hele coronacrisis, of eigenlijk dit hele coronaschandaal.
De voorzitter: Dank u wel. De heer Kwint, SP.
De heer Kwint (SP): Nou ja, goed, ik moet de heer Van Meijeren meegeven dat als er één man in staat zou zijn om die geschiedenis van desinformatie te herkennen, dat dat inderdaad de heer Van Meijeren zou moeten zijn. Dus misschien weet hij daar meer van dan ik. Het ging mij om iets anders wat hij net zei. Hij verwijt eerst journalisten met hun uitspraken bij te dragen aan een klimaat van agressie richting Forum. En vervolgens zegt hij: ja, maar wat wij doen, heeft niks met bedreiging te maken; wij zullen nooit bedreigingen goedpraten of ook maar willen initiëren. Hoe zit het nou, volgens u? Hebben woorden die mensen uiten, uiteindelijk mogelijke consequenties in daden die andere mensen gaan doen, of heeft dat helemaal niks met elkaar te maken? Want dat kan niet twee kanten op.
De heer Van Meijeren (FVD): Ik heb het helemaal niet gehad over een klimaat tegen Forum. Ik heb het erover gehad dat de media zelf ook termen bezigen waardoor bijvoorbeeld een van de leiders van een van deze partijfracties dagelijks beschermd moet worden, waardoor Pim Fortuyn door zijn hoofd geschoten is en vermoord. Dus als mensen daadwerkelijk worden neergezet als een gevaar voor deze samenleving, dan kan dat inderdaad op enig moment door sommige personen helaas, veelal uit linkse hoek, worden aangemerkt als een soort van rechtvaardiging om dan maar weer naar de wapens te grijpen. Woorden van Forum hebben daar nooit toe geleid. Dat woord “tuig” heb ik zelf overigens niet eens in eerste instantie gebruikt, maar ik kan me er best iets bij voorstellen dat je dit soort journalisten, die zich gedragen als politieke activisten, als “tuig” zou willen aanmerken. Maar dat leidt niet tot ernstige bedreigingen of geweld tegen journalisten. Dat er iemand een keer met een T-shirtje rondloopt waarop staat “NOS is fake news” … Nou, dat lijkt me nou niet een reden om in angst de stickers van je busje af te halen en niet meer naar een demonstratie te durven gaan. Als je journalist bent, hoort het bij je beroep dat je af en toe tijdens je werk, als je de hitte van de strijd opzoekt, ook te maken krijgt met een momentje van beperkte vreugde. Maar met agressie en bedreigingen heeft dat weinig tot niets te maken.
De voorzitter: Dank u wel. De heer Kwint tot slot, en dan mevrouw Ellemeet.
De heer Kwint (SP): Die momenten van beperkte vreugde herken ik ook wel. Ik moet dat hele leuterverhaal aanhoren. Het gaat mij om de inconsequentie in uw eigen redenering. U zegt eerst: die journalisten zorgen voor bedreiging, demonisering en geweld, maar als ik wat zeg, luistert er niemand en gebeurt er nooit wat. Dan kan ik me ondertussen na een paar minuten wel voorstellen. Ik kan het iedereen aanraden om te stoppen met luisteren. Maar de redenering is intern totaal inconsequent. Als journalisten wat zeggen, draagt dat bij aan een klimaat van bedreiging en intimidatie, maar u mag hier alles zeggen zonder ooit enige verantwoording ervoor af te leggen. Dat is toch totaal hypocriet?
De heer Van Meijeren (FVD): De grens ligt voor Forum voor Democratie altijd bij geweld, of bij het oproepen of aanzetten tot geweld. Daar maken wij ons niet schuldig aan. Naar mijn mening kan zoiets pas zo stellig worden gesteld als de heer Kwint dat doet op het moment dat dat geweld zich ook daadwerkelijk voltrekt. Nou, dat hebben we gezien bij onder meer de heer Fortuyn. Dat hebben we nooit gezien bij een journalist die door Forum onheus bejegend zou zijn. Dus u kunt wel zeggen dat onze woorden aanzetten tot geweld, maar de feiten wijzen daar niet op. Dus het is klinkklare kletskoek wat ik de heer Kwint hoor zeggen.
De heer Kwint (SP): Er worden mij woorden in de mond gelegd.
De voorzitter: Wilt u een punt van orde maken, omdat het een persoonlijk feit is? Dat mag. Gaat uw gang.
De heer Kwint (SP): Ja, laten we het dan een punt van orde noemen. Waar het mij om gaat, is dat ik … Ik heb echt niet de hoop dat u van standpunt gaat veranderen; het gaat mij om de consequentie van uw eigen woorden. Als u één kant op zegt dat het oproepen tot geweld is, als u één kant op erkent dat woorden gevolgen hebben en mensen tot daden kunnen aanzetten, kunt u niet als een soort kleuter met uw vingers in uw oren wegrennen, al “nanananana” roepend, op het moment dat iemand uw woorden neerlegt en vraagt wat daar de consequenties van zijn.
De heer Van Meijeren (FVD): Met het risico om in herhaling te vervallen zal ik er toch nog een keer op reageren. Wij hebben natuurlijk het volste recht om kritiek te hebben op andere politici, op journalisten, op onderzoekers, op wetenschappers en op linkse ambtenaren bij de NCTV. Wij hebben kritiek, en dat is ons goed recht. De heer Kwint trekt daar ten onrechte de conclusie uit dat dit aanzet tot geweld, want dat geweld vindt helemaal niet plaats. Dat geweld vindt plaats vanuit linkse hoek. Dat zijn gewoon de feiten. Die kan ik helaas niet veranderen voor u. Waar zien we dat er sprake is van geweld tegen mensen die gedemoniseerd zijn? Dat is aan de lopende band geweld vanuit linkse hoek.
De voorzitter: Dank u wel, meneer Van Meijeren. Graag via de voorzitter. Dan geef ik eerst het woord aan mevrouw Ellemeet en dan aan mevrouw Palland.
Mevrouw Ellemeet (GroenLinks): Ik moet zeggen dat de rillingen mij echt over de rug lopen als ik de heer Van Meijeren hoor praten: de onafhankelijke media volledig diskwalificeren als fake news. Wat dat doet in een samenleving … En dan nog beweren dat zulke uitspraken niet leiden tot geweld. Ik begon mijn eigen inbreng met allemaal voorbeelden van journalisten die geconfronteerd zijn met geweld. Dat komt ergens vandaan. Wil de heer Van Meijeren hier ontkennen dat uitspraken die wij doen, die hij doet, leiden tot beïnvloeding van heel veel mensen, wat vervolgens kan leiden tot geweld?
De heer Van Meijeren (FVD): Het is eigenlijk dezelfde vraag als de heer Kwint zojuist al stelde. Natuurlijk kunnen woorden aanzetten tot geweld. Dat is ook gewoon strafbaar. Dus als u van oordeel bent dat mijn woorden aanzetten tot geweld, moet u aangifte doen tegen mij, want dan zou ik een strafbaar feit plegen. Daar is op dit moment totaal geen sprake van. De feiten wijzen daar niet op. Ik vind het heel vervelend dat de rillingen over uw rug lopen. Mij lopen de rillingen ook weleens over de rug, maar de feiten veranderen niet door uw rillingen.
Mevrouw Ellemeet (GroenLinks): Forum voor Democratie diskwalificeert onze onafhankelijke media en geeft aan dat journalisten onze samenleving ondermijnen. Dat zijn heel vergaande uitspraken, die mensen aanzetten tot allerlei gedrag. Dan kan je wel zeggen dat het niet een-op-een is, maar het gaat erom — ik hoor dat heel veel collega’s zeggen — dat woorden niet onschuldig zijn. We moeten goed nadenken over woorden. Het diskwalificeren van onze journalisten, die hun werk onafhankelijk doen, heeft gevolgen. Daar kunnen we niet van wegkijken.
De heer Van Meijeren (FVD): Mevrouw Ellemeet spreekt zichzelf totaal tegen door het te hebben over “onze” journalisten die onafhankelijk zijn. Het zijn úw journalisten, niet de onze. Ze zijn totaal niet onafhankelijk, want als we het even over de NPO hebben, dan staan ze onder leiding van een D66-baas die betaald wordt door de overheid en daar dus afhankelijk van is. De zogenaamd onafhankelijke journalisten in Nederland hebben hun ziel ook al totaal verkocht. De hoofdredacteur van de Volkskrant heeft opgeroepen om met één mond te spreken in de coronacrisis en de lijn van het RIVM te volgen. Dat heeft niets meer te maken met het controleren van de macht. Dan ben je een applausmachine van de macht. Er is vanuit het kabinet druk uitgeoefend op De Telegraaf om niet al te veel kritiek te hebben op het RIVM. Dus over welke onafhankelijke media heeft u het eigenlijk? Er zijn nog maar een paar onafhankelijke journalistieke platforms in Nederland op dit moment. Dat zijn niet de mainstream media. Díé platforms hebben te maken met agressie, bedreigingen en geweld. Daar kom ik zo dadelijk nog op.
De voorzitter: Mevrouw Ellemeet, tot slot.
Mevrouw Ellemeet (GroenLinks): Het is dood- en doodeng dat wij in ons parlement een partij hebben die zulke uitspraken doet. Het is doodeng dat deze partij, Forum voor Democratie, journalisten die zich baseren op feiten en wetenschappelijk onderzoek diskwalificeert. Dat betekent dat het des te belangrijker wordt dat wij met alle partijen hier in deze Kamer, ook al verschillen wij op heel veel punten van elkaar, laten horen dat dit niet kan en dat wij dit niet accepteren.
De heer Van Meijeren (FVD): Nou ja, voor de laatste keer: voor ons ligt de grens bij geweld. Geweld tegen journalisten moet keihard aangepakt worden. Forum voor Democratie heeft dit jaar nog een motie gesteund om geweld tegen journalisten harder aan te pakken. En wie stemde tegen? Onder meer mevrouw Ellemeet van GroenLinks. Waarom wil mevrouw Ellemeet geweld tegen journalisten niet strenger aanpakken? Blijf bij de feiten, mevrouw Ellemeet.
Mevrouw Palland (CDA): Soms weet je bijna niet waar je moet beginnen om het gesprek nog met elkaar te zoeken, ook in dit huis. Maar ik probeer het toch. Deelt de heer Van Meijeren de analyse, die hier breed in de Kamer wordt gemaakt, dat er een probleem is met dreigingen die journalisten ervaren en dat zij zich daardoor belemmerd voelen in het uitvoeren van hun werk? Deelt u de analyse dat dit aan de hand is?
De heer Van Meijeren (FVD): Absoluut. Ik heb daar ook tal van voorbeelden van. Daar zal ik zo dadelijk ook volop aandacht aan besteden. Maar dan heb ik het dus over geweld waar aangifte van gedaan wordt en niet over iemand die een keer met een T-shirt rondloopt waarop staat “NOS is fakenews”. Want dat heeft met geweld of intimidatie helemaal niets te maken.
Mevrouw Palland (CDA): Het is helder dat dat uw analyse is. Maar we constateren hier volgens mij ook in grote meerderheid dat woorden ertoe doen, in dit huis, maar ook buiten dit huis. Ik hoor u eigenlijk zeggen: dat zal wel, maar aan ons ligt het eigenlijk niet. Dan wil ik u toch voorhouden dat u afgelopen zaterdag heeft gezegd “de overheid is de vijand; we willen het gezag niet meer erkennen”, en dat er gisteren volgens mij nog een tweet vanuit uw partij uit is gegaan die oproept om de wet te overtreden door harder te gaan rijden waar dat mogelijk is en om je niet te houden aan bijvoorbeeld de snelheidslimieten in dit land. Je kunt toch niet zeggen dat dat niet oproept tot burgerlijke ongehoorzaamheid? Het brengt mensen in ieder geval niet dichter bij elkaar en is juist opruiend.
De heer Van Meijeren (FVD): Het doet mij oprecht, oprecht pijn dat ik moet constateren dat de regering zich op dit moment opstelt als vijand van de bevolking. Voor het eerst sinds de Tweede Wereldoorlog hebben we weer een regering die wetten voorbereidt op grond waarvan een staat van apartheid wordt gecreëerd en waardoor mensen worden buitengesloten van het sociaal-maatschappelijk leven. Het is noodzakelijk om niet te zwichten voor tirannen. Wij zullen niet zwichten voor tirannen. Als er regelgeving tot stand komt op grond waarvan complete bevolkingsgroepen worden gediscrimineerd, dan roep ik op om daar niet aan te gehoorzamen. Want dan is gehoorzaamheid een grotere misdaad dan ongehoorzaamheid. De verschrikkingen die de Joden zijn aangedaan in de Tweede Wereldoorlog zijn gepleegd door mensen die gehoorzaam waren en niet door mensen die ongehoorzaam waren.
De voorzitter: Dank u wel. Meneer Van Meijeren, ik wil zelf als voorzitter ook wat zeggen. U gebruikt grote woorden. U maakt weer een vergelijking met de Tweede Wereldoorlog. Ik hecht er waarde aan om te zeggen dat ik dit echt ongepast vind. Ik denk dat een aantal collega’s daar ook iets over willen zeggen. Allereerst mevrouw Palland van het CDA.
Mevrouw Palland (CDA): Ja. Nogmaals, je weet soms niet waar je moet beginnen om elkaar hier nog aan te spreken, maar het is volstrekt ontoelaatbaar wat u hier allemaal te berde brengt. We nemen daar denk ik als volledige Kamer volstrekt afstand van. U heeft geen idee wat een dictatuur of een tirannie is.
De voorzitter: Als ik naar de gezichten van de collega’s kijk, denk ik dat mevrouw Palland het heel goed heeft samengevat. Ik wil u vragen, meneer Van Meijeren, om echt op uw woorden te passen.
De heer Van Meijeren (FVD): Feit is dat het voor het eerst sinds de Tweede Wereldoorlog zo is dat mensen weer een pasje krijgen aan de hand waarvan ze moeten bewijzen of ze wel of niet toegang krijgen tot het sociaal-maatschappelijk leven. Ik zou willen dat er in de jaren dertig mensen waren opgestaan die hier keihard tegen ingingen. En nog even tot slot, voordat u allemaal verontwaardigd naar de interruptiemicrofoon loopt.
De voorzitter: U krijgt zo de kans.
De heer Van Meijeren (FVD): In het jaar 1933 was er een gekozen volksvertegenwoordiger die Adolf Hitler “een boef” noemde. Hem werd het woord ontnomen, met twintig stemmen tegen zes. Als een meerderheid vindt dat er geen sprake is van tirannie, betekent dat dus niet dat er daarmee geen sprake is van tirannie. Wij zullen ons altijd met hand en tand blijven verzetten tegen ieder beleid dat erop gericht is om bevolkingsgroepen te discrimineren.
De voorzitter: Meneer Van Meijeren, ik doe nogmaals een oproep aan u. Uw woorden zijn kwetsend. Als ik kijk naar mijn collega’s, zie ik ook hun reactie. Ik wil dus nu echt vragen om echt op uw woorden te letten en uw verhaal af te maken. Vervolgens schorsen we de vergadering even.
De heer Van Meijeren (FVD): Om misverstanden te voorkomen, …
De voorzitter: Ik zou het heel fijn vinden als u aan mij als voorzitter bevestigt dat u echt rekening houdt met uw woorden in deze Kamer. Het is ook mijn rol om daar toezicht op te houden. Ik zie de reacties van de collega’s. Ik weet zeker dat ook buiten deze Kamer uw woorden als heel kwetsend opgevat kunnen woorden. Ik wil u dus echt vragen om daarop te letten. Dan geef ik u weer het woord om uw verhaal af te maken.
De heer Van Meijeren (FVD): Om misverstanden te voorkomen: Forum voor Democratie bepleit op geen enkele manier dat de verschrikkingen van de Tweede Wereldoorlog in de buurt komen van wat op dit moment ongevaccineerden wordt aangedaan. Natuurlijk niet. Het is een glijdende schaal. Eerst werden de Joden uitgesloten om naar de bioscoop te gaan, toen mochten ze …
De voorzitter: Meneer Van Meijeren, ik schors de vergadering even en wil heel graag even met u in gesprek.
De heer Van Meijeren (FVD): Prima.
De vergadering wordt enkele ogenblikken geschorst.
De voorzitter: Ik wil aan de heer Van Meijeren vragen om zijn verhaal af te maken. Het woord is aan de heer Van Meijeren.
De heer Van Meijeren (FVD): Voorzitter. In 2010 beweerde de heer Job Cohen in een interview in Vrij Nederland, en ik citeer: “Moslims in Nederland worden buitengesloten zoals de Joden dat rond het begin van de Tweede Wereldoorlog overkwam”. Waar was toen de verontwaardiging? Moslims in Nederland werden niet uitgesloten van het sociaal-maatschappelijk leven; die zijn altijd welkom geweest, in ieder restaurant, in de …
De voorzitter: Helaas, ik schors de vergadering weer.
De vergadering wordt enkele ogenblikken geschorst.
De voorzitter: Ik geef tot slot het woord aan de heer Van Meijeren.
De heer Van Meijeren (FVD): Dank u wel, voorzitter. Ik vervolg mijn betoog.
Onze democratie, voor zover überhaupt nog van democratie gesproken kan worden, functioneert totaal niet. De mainstreamjournalistiek is vandaag de dag volstrekt ongeloofwaardig. Niet meer serieus te nemen. Niet eens geïnteresseerd in de waarheid maar vooral druk om de waarheid te manipuleren. Geen controleur van de macht maar schoothondje van de macht. Een applausmachine van de macht. In feite hebben we het hier niet over journalisten maar over activisten.
Journalisten en onderzoekers die hun rol wél serieus nemen en wél op zoek durven te gaan naar de waarheid, krijgen te maken met ernstige bedreigingen, censuur, agressie en intimidatiepraktijken. Zelfs vanuit de overheid. Neem het journalistieke platform Blackbox. Een journalist die een interview afnam met iemand die kritisch is op het overheidsbeleid, kreeg de politie aan de deur. De reden: hij zou een complotdenker hebben geïnterviewd. Toen hij vroeg “wat is dan een complotdenker?”, kreeg hij van de politie — ik citeer — te horen: “Iemand die tegenovergesteld denkt als wat de overheid verwacht.” Dus denk je anders dan de overheid verwacht, dan kun je de gedachtepolitie aan je deur verwachten. Hoe beoordeelt de minister deze afschuwelijke intimidatiepraktijken richting de vrije pers?
Ook andere ambtenaren van de minister intimideren erop los. Het journalistieke platform De Blauwe Tijger werd in de dreigingsanalyse van de NCTV aangemerkt als “een doorgeefluik van antioverheidspropaganda”. Dus als je niet de overheidspropaganda klakkeloos kopieert, zoals de mainstreammedia, maar een ánder geluid laat horen, dan vorm je voor de regering een bedreiging. En woorden blijven niet zonder gevolgen. De ING besloot vervolgens om de bankrekening van dit journalistieke platform te blokkeren, net als bankrekeningen van tal van andere journalistieke platforms die een kritisch geluid laten horen in het coronadebat. Onderzoekers die publiceerden over het buitensporige geweld door de politie tegen coronademonstranten kregen te maken met ernstige doodsbedreigingen. Kan de minister aangeven wat de stand van zaken is van een strafrechtelijk onderzoek naar deze doodsbedreigers? En hoe beoordeelt de minister de harde realiteit dat journalisten die niet zwichten voor de druk vanuit de overheid om de coronapropaganda over te nemen, te maken krijgen met ernstige agressie? Graag een reactie.
Forum voor Democratie zal zich altijd met hand en tand blijven inzetten voor de vrijheid en veiligheid van onze journalisten. Want zonder vrije pers geen democratie.
Dank u wel.
(bron: ongecorrigeerd verslag van een plenaire vergadering van de Tweede Kamer over bedreiging van journalisten, 9 september 2021)
Dertig jaar geleden (op 27 juni 1991) begin in Slovenië de eerste van de vier burgeroorlogen in het voormalige Joegoslavië. Hij duurde maar kort (10 dagen) en er vielen betrekkelijk weinig slachtoffers. De oorlogen in Kroatië, Bosnië en Kosovo zouden volgen en waren van een heel andere orde van grootte. Maar voor mij was het de eerste oorlog die ik meemaakte. Alleen al daarom een indrukwekkende ervaring.
Begin 1991 was ik in Praag begonnen als freelance correspondent Oost-Europa van de Telegraaf. Al rap kwam Joegoslavië bovenaan het prioriteitenlijstje. In snel tempo dreigde het land uiteen te vallen en alom werd rekening gehouden met gewelddadigheden of zelfs oorlog.
Telegraaf, 18 maart 1991
Op 25 juni verklaarden Kroatië en Slovenië zich onafhankelijk. Twee dagen later brak dus in het laatste land de pleuris uit. De reden: de Slovenen hadden alle grensposten (en dus de douane-inkomsten) overgenomen van het centraal gezag in Belgrado. De regering stuurde wat militaire eenheden naar die posten om ze terug te veroveren, maar dat werd grotendeels een mislukking.
De Slovenen hadden zich in de voorafgaande maanden degelijk voorbereid en de ‘territoriale reserves’ van het federale leger omgetoverd tot een eigen legertje. Niet zwaarbewapend met tanks en zo, maar sterk genoeg om de betrekkelijk bescheiden inzet van het federale leger het hoofd te bieden. Hun sterke punt: hinderlagen, bijvoorbeeld met anti-tank wapens. Ik zag ook tankauto’s (met benzine, naar ik aannam) die dwars over bergweggetjes waren gezet, slimme improvisatie.
De Slovenen boden de internationale pers prima service. Er waren briefings van leidinggevenden zoals de toen nog jonge minister van Defensie Janez Janša, nu premier van het land. Ik maakte vanuit de hoofdstad Ljubljana dagtripjes met behulp van studenten die als gids voor de buitenlandse pers werden ingezet. Of reed zelf op goed geluk rond in het land, op zoek naar verhalen. Internet, gsm en smartphones bestonden nog niet dus was het een soort houtje-touwtje verslaggeving.
(Janez Janša)
Ik trok de bergen in omdat ik gehoord had dat er buitenlandse toeristen waren gestrand. En inderdaad, ik trof er Nederlanders aan die, vernikkeld van de kou en zonder veel cash bij zich geen kant op konden. In het zuiden bezocht ik een federale tankeenheid. Na een prettig gesprek met twee dienstplichtige soldaten aan de poort stormde een dolgedraaide officier met getrokken pistool op me af. Wat hij schreeuwde kon ik niet verstaan maar de boodschap was duidelijk – ik blies de aftocht. Eenmaal terug in de auto begonnen mijn knieën onbedaarlijk te trillen.
Ik bezocht in Krško ook de enige kerncentrale van Slovenië, vlakbij de grens met Kroatië. De vrees bestond dat de ‘federalen’ het complex zouden kunnen aanvallen, maar een woordvoerder verzekerde me dat het dak van de Honeywell-centrale dik genoeg was om een directe treffer te kunnen weerstaan. Er waren wel andere gevaarlijke scenario’s waarmee men rekening hield maar ik herinner me niet dat ik daarover details heb gepubliceerd.
Telegraaf, 28 juni 1991
Een eindje verderop werd op een gegeven moment flink gevochten. Ik klopte bij mensen aan om de redactie in Amsterdam te kunnen bellen (zoals gezegd, mobiele telefoons bestonden nog niet). Ik werd hartelijk ontvangen met koffie en zo. Het gezin keek geïnteresseerd naar de TV. Wat daar te zien was? Gevechten die zich twee dorpen verderop bleken af te spelen. Bizar…
Achteraf bleken de vijandelijkheden in Slovenië relatief gezien maar kinderspel te zijn geweest. Er waren geen wreedheden en moordpartijen zoals later in Kroatië en Bosnië. Er waren ook nauwelijks etnische tegenstellingen – geen Servische minderheid van enige omvang bijvoorbeeld. Dat er een oorlog uitbrak was bizar genoeg, al was het maar omdat het Sloveense landschap en de huizen zoveel leken op die in buurland Oostenrijk – Slovenië was ook veruit de meest welvarende republiek van Joegoslavië. Dat maakte de ervaring voor mij ook bijzonder: dat in een ogenschijnlijk welvarend en beschaafd land van de ene op de andere dag een oorlog kon uitbreken.
(Verzameling van mijn artikelen over Slovenië in Delpher)
Hans de Vreij's blog 